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Love Makes a Family-Nothing More, Nothing Less:*
How the Judicial System Has Refused to Protect
Nonlegal Parents in Alternative Families
BarbaraJ. Cox**
Alternative families' have achieved some limited success in obtaining
recognition for their families and obtaining benefits normally provided
to traditional nuclear families. The impetus for this movement to
expand the provision of recognition and benefits from traditional
nuclear families to alternative families has been a recognition that the
nuclear family, once considered the traditional paradigm for the defini-
tion of family in our society, has decreased in prevalence significantly in
the past thirty years.2 Because of this decrease in the number of tradi-
tional nuclear families and the concurrent increase in the number of
alternative families, 3 a campaign has been in existence for the past sev-
* This banner flew from the stage at the 1987 Gay and Lesbian March on Washington. K.
Weston, Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship 107 (1991).
** Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; B.A. 1978 Michigan State
University; J.D. 1982 University of Wisconsin. I would like to thank California Western
School of Law for research grant support. I would also like to thank the following colleagues
for reading earlier drafts and providing insightful comments: Linda Morton, Janet
Bowermaster, Frank Valdes, and Mary Ray. I would also like to thank my research assistants,
Robin Lloyd and Kelly Patch, for their assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Peg Habetler
for sustaining my spirit throughout this project.
I The term "alternative family" as used in this article means:
Two or more adults, not related by blood, marriage or adoption, who are
involved in a mutually supportive, committed relationship . . . together with
their dependent children.
Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through Litigation, Legis-
lation and Collective Bargaining, 2 Wis. Women's L.J. 1, 3 n.8 (1986).
2 Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the
Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1640, 1640 n.l (1991)[hereinafter Family
Resemblance] which indicates that the proportion of families consisting of a married couple
and their minor children has declined from 44.2% in 1960 to 27.0% in 1988. Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Special Studies Series P-23,
No. 163, Changes in American Family Life 10 (1989)(fig. 8).
3 Family Resemblance, supra note 2, at 1640 nn.2-4. For example, in 1988, single parents
living with their minor children had doubled from 1970 to 1988 to 27.3% of households.
Children living with a stepparent had increased by 11.6%. Unmarried couple households
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eral years by members of alternative families pursuing recognition
through legislation, litigation, and collective bargaining.4 This cam-
paign has focused on obtaining recognition and benefits for the alter-
native family. Numerous cities and employers have begun to recognize
these families and provide them with some of the same benefits that
traditional families receive.5
This movement to achieve recognition and benefits has proceeded
primarily with a focus on recognizing the adult partners in the family.
In fact, many of the plans are referred to as domestic partnership
plans.6 What has been slow in coming, in fact virtually non-existent, is
recognition of the parental bonds that are being entered into within
these families. This is true despite the ever-increasing number of chil-
dren living in alternative families. 7
consisting of two unrelated adults of the opposite sex with or without children increased from
523,000 to 2,764,000 in 1989. The number of gay men and lesbians living together, while not
officially counted by census figures, have increased also. Id.
4 Cox, supra note 1, at 4-5. See also, Berger, Domestic Partner Initiatives, 40 DePaul L.
Rev. 417 (1991).
5 National Center for Lesbian Rights Newsletter 3 (Spring/Summer 1991). Among the
private sector "domestic partnership" plans in effect are the following: the American Civil
Liberties Union/Northern California; American Friends Service Committee/Philadelphia, PA;
American Psychological Association/Washington D.C.; Ben &Jerry's Homemade/Waterbury,
VT; Columbia University/New York, NY; Committee of Interns & Residents Staff Union/New
York, NY; Consumers United Insurance Company/Washington, D.C.; Greenpeace/
Washington D.C.; Human Rights Campaign Fund/Washington, D.C.; Lambda Legal Defense
& Education Fund/New York, NY; Montefiore Medical Center/New York,NY; Mt. Sinai
Hospital Nurses/New York, NY; Museum of Modern Art/New York, NY; National Center for
Lesbian Rights/San Francisco, CA; National Organization for Women/Washington, D.C.;
New York-New Jersey Telephone Company workers/New York, NY; New York University/
New York, NY; Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers/New York; Seattle Mental Health Institute/
Seattle, WA; Stanford University/Palo Alto, CA; University Students Cooperative Assoc
iation/Berkeley, CA; Village Voice Newspaper/New York, NY. Lotus Corporation has just
announced that it will provide benefits to all its employees living in alternative famlies. Wis.
STATE JOURNAL, SEPT. 8, 1991, AT 3G, COL. 4.
The following cities have also provided some benefits for domestic partners: Alameda
County, CA; Berkeley, CA; Ithaca, NY; Laguna Beach, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Madison, WI;
Minneapolis, MN; New York, NY; Ottawa, Ontario, CANADA; San Francisco, CA; San Jose
School District, CA; San Mateo County, CA; Santa Cruz, CA; Seattle, WA; Takoma Park, MD;
Toronto, Ontario, CANADA; University of British Columbia, CANADA; West Hollywood,
CA; Yukon Territory, CANADA. These plans vary widely. For example, in Madison,
Wisconsin, the benefits are simply the ability to file as domestic partners and eligibility for city
employees to use sick leave and bereavement leave to care for their family members. In San
Francisco, California, benefits extend beyond recognition to inclusion by city employees of
their alternative families on the city's health insurance plan.
6 Cox, supra note 1, at 3 n.8. See also, National Center for Lesbian Rights Newsletter,
supra note 5, at 3.
7 One author estimates that the number of children living with a lesbian mother or gay
father range from one to six million. N. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers:
Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
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Those parental relationships within alternative families that have
received limited recognition are either based on a biological connection
with the child or a marital relationship with the biological parent. Bio-
logical fathers living outside a marital relationship with their child's
mother achieved constitutional protection against state interference
with that relationship in Stanley v. Illinois.8 This constitutional protec-
tion has been clarified in the twenty years following Stanley to protect
unwed fathers who had developed substantial relationships with their
children.9 The only nonbiological parents who have been successful in
maintaining the parent-child relationship developed during an ongoing
alternative family relationship, even after that family relationship has
dissolved, are adults who have marital relationships with the biological
parent of the child.1"
Unmarried heterosexual, gay, or lesbian nonlegal" parents in dis-
solving alternative families have been virtually unsuccessful in
obtaining legal recognition of their parental, but legally unsanctioned,
relationships with the children with whom they shared an alternative
family relationship. This lack of success is unexpected given the courts'
willingness to use both statutory interpretation and equitable doctrines
to preserve the parental bonds between stepparents and the children in
Nontraditional Families, 78 Geo. L.J. 459, 461 n.2 (1990). The number orchildren living with
a stepparent was 6,789,000 in 1985. Family Resemblance, supra note 2, at 1640 n. 3. In fact,
a lesbian mothers' "baby boom" has been growing for the past several years. It is estimated
that thousands of lesbians around the country are having children, many of them with their
partners. G. Kolata, Lesbian Partners Find the Means to Be Parents, N.Y. Times, Jan 30,
1989, A13, col. 1.
8 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
9 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). As this article will show, that recognition
and protection has been compromised by the plurality decision in Michael H. and Victoria D.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). See infra Section Ila.
10 Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987); In re Paternity of
D.L.H., 142 Wis. 2d 606, 419 N.W.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1987); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64
(Utah 1978); Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982); Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super.
168, 378 A.2d 879 (1979); In re Marriage of D.L.J., 162 Wis. 2d 420,469 N.W.2d 877 (1991);
Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1979); Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978); Collins v. Gilbreath,
403 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Bryan v. Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
II This term is used to denote the adult member of alternative families who has no legal tie
to the child of those families. Those children are usually biologically related or legally related
by adoption to the other adult member of the family. Although courts considering these cases
tend to refer to these nonlegal parents as "biological strangers," Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77
N.Y.2d 651, 654-655, 572 N.E.2d 27, 28, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587 (1991) or "non-parents," In
re the Interest of Z.J.H., 162 Wis. 2d 1002, 1010, 471 N.W.2d 202, 205 (1991), the use of the
term "nonlegal parent" in this article is intended to recognize the parental bonds between the
adult and child. These parental bonds were developed with care and nurturing and deserve
not to be severed through the use of terms that ignore those bonds.
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those alternative families.' 2 Expansive statutory interpretation and
application of equitable doctrines have been used by courts to mediate
the harsh results that occurred at divorce due to the lack of a legal con-
nection between the stepparent and his or her spouse's children."
The courts, however, have been unwilling to mediate similar harsh
results that occur with the dissolution of nonmarital-based, alternative
families.
A review of three specific cases from New York, Wisconsin, and Cali-
fornia involving claims by lesbian nonlegal parents illuminates the
series of legal maneuvers used by appellate and supreme courts to deny
these parents an opportunity to continue a relationship with their 4
children.' 5 While these denials have all involved lesbian families and
may indicate a greater level of reluctance to recognize parental bonds
in same-sex alternative families,' 6 they exist as precedent that can be
used to deny recognition to all alternative families regardless of the
sexual orientation of the adults in the family.' 7 This precedent shows
an unwillingness by the courts to expand recognition beyond those
alternative families that are marital-based.
All three decisions have included a claim by the majority that the
state legislature is the proper forum for attempts to preserve the paren-
tal relationships between nonlegal parents and their children in dissolv-
ing alternative families.'" While legislation would be a preferable
12 Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 Va. L. Rev. 879, 914-915 (1984). The
equitable doctrines used include the doctrines of equitable estoppel, equitable parenthood,
de facto parenthood, and in loco parentis. Id. For a fuller discussion of these doctrines and
their application, see infra Section I.
13 Id.
14 Just as the term "nonlegal parent" is used to refer to the co-parents in alternative
families and to recognize their relationships with the children in their families, I use the
"possessives" "his", "her," or "their" to signify the attachment between nonlegal parents and
their children.
15 The cases are the following: In the Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651,
572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991); In re Interest of ZJ.H., 162 Wis.2d 1002, 471
N.W.2d 202 (1991); Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1st
Dis. 1991).
16 Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the
United States, 30 Hast. LJ. 799, 947-948 (1979).
17 This denial is particularly poignant for lesbian and gay families because the adults in
those families cannot obtain legal recognition of their relationship with the biological parent
in the way that heterosexual unmarried couples can do through marriage. "Lesbian and gay
people in our society cannot attain a legally recognized marriage." Colker, Marriage, 3 Yale
J.L. & Feminism 321, 321 (1991). While I am not advocating that heterosexual couples
should be forced to marry to receive either benefits or protection of their parental bonds to
their children, this option remains unavailable to lesbians and gay men.
18 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra Section III.
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method for obtaining this protection,' 9 this abdication by the courts of
their responsibility to use the means available to them is troublesome
for several reasons. First, the possibility of political victory is extremely
limited and would require the expenditure of immense resources and a
significant amount of time. 20 Additionally, in the area of protecting gay
men and lesbians, experience establishes that legislative change often
results in geographically localized change that is subject to the chang-
ing whims of the majority, as can be seen from the repeal efforts for
both anti-discrimination and domestic partnership legislation.2 ' These
problems are particularly acute given the political right's attachment to
the family as a political rallying card. Attempting to expand the defini-
tion of "family" and "parent" at the legislative level will take an expen-
sive, elongated battle.
Additionally, many courts have recognized that gay men and lesbi-
ans, as members of a minority group, are rendered "politically power-
less" in their dealings with the legislative system and are thereby
particularly unable to obtain the legislative changes they seek.22
Despite the difficult battle that will occur to obtain this legislative
change, those battles need to be fought. Only through specific legisla-
tive change recognizing the nonlegal parents' relationship with the chil-
19 Actually, the preferred mode of protecting these nonlegal parents would be by finding
unconstitutional state laws that deny them recognition. This mode would be preferable to
achieving changes in state statutes because it would provide protection on a nation-wide basis,
rather than a piecemeal approach through'individual states' statutes. The Supreme Court's
decision in Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), however, indicates
that this constitutional protection is probably not forthcoming. See infra Section I(a) for a
more detailed discussion of this case.
20 See infra Section III, discussing the numerous problems of obtaining legislative
recognition. Any attempts to achieve legislative change to protect alternative families or gay
men and lesbians generally entails a significant amount of time. For example, passing a local
alternative families' ordinance in Madison, Wisconsin, which provided city employees with the
option of using their sick leave and bereavement leave to care for the family members and to
change the zoning ordinance to permit alternative families to live in single-family
neighborhoods, took over six years. Cox, Choosing One's Family: Can the Legal System
Address the Breadth of Women's Choice of Intimate Relationships, VIII St. Louis U. Pub. L.
Rev. 299, 305 (1989). Passage of the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, civil rights
legislation protecting gay men and lesbians from discrimination in employment, housing,
credit, and public accomodations, took a seventeen-year struggle. Comment, Sex, Lies and
Civil Rights: A Critical History of the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 549, 549 (1991) [hereinafter, Sex, Lies and Civil Rights].
21 Id. at 557-558. Among the repeal efforts currently being attempted include the attempt
to repeal the San Francisco domestic partners ordinance. The ordinance provides health
benefits to registered domestic partners. Conklin and Mosley, SF's Partners Law Targeted:
Fundamentalists' Petition May Force Vote, Bay Area Reporter, July 4, 1991, at 1, col. 5.
22 See infra Section III, and cases cited therein discussing attempts by gay men and lesbians
to obtain constitutional protection as a quasi-suspect class from discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation under the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause.
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dren in their alternative families will any type of security adhere to
those relationships. State legislatures need to provide a comprehensive
statutory scheme providing broad-based parental rights to nonlegal
parents who qualify for parental status.
While that change is occurring, however, the relationships between
nonlegal parents and children in alternative families will continue to be
destroyed at a frightening rate. s Personal lives and relationships,
especially those between parents and young children, cannot withstand
the glacial pace that legislative change, if any, will take.
Because legislation does not currently exist in most states24 and new
legislation will take a long time to obtain, nonlegal parents of alterna-
tive families faced with losing their children have turned to the courts
seeking individualized solutions for preserving their parental bonds
with their children. These nonlegal parents and children have sought
relief from the judicial system to protect them while the legislative
struggle goes forward. But so far that relief has been denied.
It has been denied despite the numerous possibilities that exist,
under statutory interpretation or under existing equitable theories, to
preserve their relationships with their children. No new legislation
must be passed before their relationships can be recognized. Most
states have statutes that could easily be interpreted to protect these
nonlegal parents and children. Numerous equitable theories also could
be applied to protect these relationships.
Given the real possibility of legislative denial of recognition and the
increasing numbers of courts who are following that denial with case-
by-case denial, one begins to understand the impact of this frustrating,
unfair refusal to protect legitimate parental rights. By taking the time
to analyze these courts' opinions, one realizes that the judicial system
has abdicated its responsibility to use the means available to it to
address this serious problem encountered by thousands of families
across the country. Rather than using traditional conceptions of the
family to close the courthouse door in the faces of alternative family
members, the legal system must come to grips with the real problems
facing both the nonlegal parents and the children living in these fami-
23 The fact that three state appellate courts have all addressed this issue within a three
month period in 1991 indicates that this problem is occurring in significant numbers across
the country. Additionally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently decided a case involving
lesbian parents in Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175 (1991). Before the New Mexico Court of
appeals, a similar case, Couch v. Bellestri, is pending. For a more detailed discussion of the
Kulla case, see infra note 281.
24 See infra notes 277-281 and accompanying text which discusses legislation in Oregon
and Minnesota that has begun to resolve these problems.
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lies. For while the legal system can maintain its cavalier denial of rec-
ognition, it ignores the pain, trauma, and heartache it is engendering
with its callous attitude toward these adults and their children.
Part I of this article discusses the legal system's recognition of paren-
tal rights and enumerates the possible constitutional, statutory, and
equitable theories available for protecting the parental rights of nonle-
gal parents. Part II considers the cases that have rejected the attempts
by members of alternative families to use these theories to obtain this
protection. Part III discusses the barriers to political power that will
make it extremely difficult and time-consuming to achieve legislative
change in these areas, and argues that the courts should use the means
available to them currently to protect these nonlegal parents and their
children while the legislative battles continue.
I. THE CURRENT DEFINITION OF PARENTHOOD AND THE THEORIES
THAT COULD EXPAND THAT DEFINITION TO INCLUDE THE
NONLEGAL PARENTS OF ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES
Parenthood is an exclusive status in the law, meaning that the law
recognizes only two parents for a child at any one time2 5 and only rec-
ognizes one parent of each sex. 6 Due in part to its exclusive nature,
parenthood is a powerful status. Parents have comprehensive rights
over their children which operate against all others.
2 7
Parents have the right to custody of their child; to discipline the
child; and to make decisions about education, medical treatment,
and religious upbringing. Parents assign the child a name. They
have a right to the child's earnings and services. They decide
where the child shall live. Parents have a right to information
gathered by others about the child and may exclude others from
that information. They may speak for the child and may assert or
waive the child's fights. Parents have the right to determine who
may visit the child and to place their child in another's care.
Parents' duties correspond to their rights. Parents must care
for their child, support him [or her] financially, see to his [or her]
education, and provide him [or her] proper medical care. They
have the duty to control the child, and if they fail in this duty,
they may be required to answer for the child's wrongdoings.
25 Bartlett, supra note 12, at 879.
26 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 468.
27 See Bartlett, supra note 12, at 884.
28 Id. at 884-885.
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The state imposes some restrictions on parents' rights over their chil-
dren, but usually only as an effort to protect the child from injury or
abuse by the parent.
29
Given the broad rights and duties that parents have over their chil-
dren, the legal system must limit the number of adults who have paren-
tal status. This is especially true because parental status is indivisible as
well as exclusive.3 0 Indivisibility means that each parent, with respect
to his or her own child, has every right and duty given to parents.
3
, If
there are two parents, the law assumes that the parents will exercise
their rights and duties in concert with one another; if there is one par-
ent, the law provides that parent with all parental rights and duties.3 2
The indivisibility aspect of parenthood does make it difficult to pro-
vide parental rights and duties to numerous individuals. It would be
difficult if several adults had to decide jointly how to make education or
medical decisions. Obtaining agreement would also be difficult. Thus,
the legal system chose the easiest and clearest possibility: each child
naturally has only two parents; therefore, the legal system recognizes
only those two parents. 3 This framework led Justice Scalia in the
Michael H. decision to state "California law, like nature itself, makes no
provision for dual fatherhood."3 4
But this framework immediately causes problems for the parents and
children of alternative families, whether the adults are gay, lesbian,
married, or unmarried. Oftentimes the children of these families do
have two parents of the same sex, either living in the same household
or living in different households. For example, a child born to married
parents who divorce and then both remarry functionally may have two
mothers and two fathers. A child with lesbian parents will have two
mothers; a child with gay parents will have two fathers. These children
usually do not have problems having multiple parents of the same sex,
but the legal system founders upon this diversity. 5
29 For example, states prevent parents from injuring their children severely when
disciplining them; from making unconventional medical treatment that may cause death, even
if based on religious grounds; from committing their child to a mental institution without
review by professionals; from violating child labor laws; and from having unlimited options in
educating them. Id. at 885.
30 Id. at 883.
3' Id.
32 Id.
33 This formulation itself is suspect. For example, the child who is born as a result of the
artificial insemination of his mother with the sperm of an unknown donor only has two natural
parents if parental status is accorded to the unknown father.
34 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118.
35 For example, the mental health of children raised in lesbian-mother households differs
little from children raised in heterosexual-mother households. Polikoff, supra note 7, at 561.
[Vol. VIII:5
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The reality of a child's life does not depend upon legal rules. In
assessing the rights of parents who do not fit the one-mother/
one-father status, courts can either preserve the fiction of this
status regardless of the child's reality, or they can recognize
diversity and tailor rules accordingly. They cannot, however, make
the family life of all children uniform. There will continue to be chil-
dren whose functional fathers are not their biological fathers,
there will continue to be stepparent relationships that look indis-
tinguishable from biological parent relationships,3 6 and there
will continue to be lesbian-mother families.
3 7
What the legal system has done is to refuse to recognize this differ-
ence between the traditional nuclear family and alternative families. By
refusing to recognize the reality of alternative families, it is free to con-
tinue its theoretical stance of "one parent of each sex per child." But
this refusal requires sacrificing the relationship between nonlegal par-
ents and their children. The legal system presumes that only parental
relationships that are legally based need to be protected. While it is
important to protect parental autonomy3 8 and to recognize the
problems that may arise when multiple people have parental status, 9
the answer cannot be to refuse recognition to these nonlegal parents.
This refusal, in itself, sacrifices parental autonomy. The reality is that
nonlegal parents are parents. In many cases, to their children, they are
The quality of mothering, not the sexual orientation of the mother, is what matters most in a
child's mental health. Id. at 561-562. One court has held that children may benefit from
being raised by gay or lesbian parents because they "emerge better equipped to search out
their own standards of right and wrong, better able to perceive that the majority is not always
correct in its moral judgments, and better able to understand the importance of conforming
their beliefs to the requirements of reason and tested knowledge, not the constraints of
currently popular sentiment or prejudice." Id. at 570 (citing M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super 425,
404 A.2d 1256 (App. Div. 1979)).
36 Bartlett points out that, while a stepparent is psychologically a stranger to a child at first,
he or she is also the adult who is closest to the child's parent. Additionally, according to the
common law, the stepparent-stepchild relationship does not give rise to any legal rights or
obligations. Bartlett, supra note 12, at 912-913. The stepparent does not need to accept the
child or support the child. While the stepparent can be recognized as standing in loco
parentis to his or her stepchild, that is not the same as legal parenthood. The stepparent may
abandon the in loco parentis relationship at any time and, because the relationship is based on
the marriage of the natural parent and the stepparent, it disappears upon divorce. Id. at 913-
914.
37 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 473.
38 For example, weakening the legal requirement for parental autonomy has led to some
non-parents, such as grandparents, being successful in obtaining custody from lesbian
biological mothers. Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles, Legal
Challenges, XIV Rev. L. & Soc. Change 907, 910 (1986).
39 These same problems can occur, however, when biological parents have problems
resolving issues between them when they divorce. Just as the judicial system is able to resolve
them in those situations, it can also resolve them when they arise between nonlegal parents
and legal parents.
Journal of Law & Politics [Vol. VIII:5
indistinguishable from the parent who is legally recognized. Both par-
ents may have been part of the child's life since his or her first aware-
ness. Both parents provide the caretaking functions that the child
depends on and expects.4° The child knows that the nonlegal parent is
his or her parent. The only problem is that the legal system does not
share that knowledge.
What is most discouraging for these nonlegal parents is that this
refusal of recognition and protection by the legal system is unneces-
sary. New legislation, while preferable, does not need to be passed.
New theories do not need to be developed. Instead, the legal system
could use the numerous options available to it for recognizing alterna-
tive families and provide protection to the nonlegal parents and the
children of these families.
Some of the current options available for recognizing alternative
families include (1) providing constitutional protection to alternative
families, as is provided to traditional families; (2) interpreting existing
statutes' use of the term "parent" to include nonlegal parents; (3)
40 Numerous stories exist of alternative families living in situations that are virtually
identical to traditional families.
Maria andJulie are just like any other Canadian couple with young kids. "We're
tired all the time and we never have sex," says Maria .... [Olur fears, hopes,
ambitions, our desires for our children are no different from the person down
the block." Maria andJulie are lesbians and mothers. They have two children, a
5-year-old boy and a 1 '/2-year-old girl .... In day-to-day life, she andJulie don't
play mommy or daddy roles, she says, they're just themselves. "I take our the
garbage and she tends to cook. I put the kids to bed, while she does the dishes
and cleans up the kitchen. Our values and methods of discipline are quite
similar."
Scotton, Gay Parents, Toronto Star, July 2, 1991, at Fl.
Janice and Crystal are living as a family with Crystal's two daughters. Janice is a
non-biological mother and co-parent for Crystal's two daughers. Janice and
Crystal have the children in their home every other week under a joint custody
arrangement with the children's father. Janice is completely involved in feeding,
caring for, and raising the girls, from preparing meals, taking them to school,
bathing them, reading bedtime stories, instilling responsibility in the girls to
care for themselves, and encouraging the girls to share their lives with her. She
has both physical and emotional responsibility for the girls and is treated within
the family as a co-parent .... However, outside the family, Janice's role in the
girls' lives and her responsibility for them is not recognized. . . .Janice's
[employer refuses] to allow her to use her sick leave to care for the girls when
they are sick even though sick leave is given to her co-workers who are biological
parents or stepparents to care for their children. If Crystal did not receive
employer-based insurance which covered the girls, Janice would want to be able
to provide insurance for her family but would be unable to do so. If Crystal
were ill or unable to care for the girls, Janice would want to take over the girls'
care, but would be prevented from doing so.
Cox, supra note 20, at 312-313.
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applying either Bartlett's or Polikoff's theories to alternative families to
aid in defining statutory terms in a reasoned manner; and (4) applying
various equitable doctrines to alternative family arrangements, includ-
ing equitable parenthood, equitable estoppel, in loco parentis, and de
facto parenthood.4 ' But the courts have rejected each of these theories
in the context of one or another factual situation facing alternative
families.
A. Constitutional Protection
The preferable mode of obtaining protection for these parents and
children would be to obtain a national solution by achieving constitu-
tional protection for parents and children in alternative families. Given
the increasingly conservative tenor of the federal courts,4 2 this option
may seem unlikely. Despite this political restriction, existing constitu-
tional doctrine would support such an attempt.
The Supreme Court has consistently protected traditional families
and parents from state laws impinging on them.43 For example, in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters," the Court reviewed a state statute requiring
parents and guardians to send their children to public school. The
Court held that the statute violated the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause because it "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren under their control."4 5 Additionally, in Moore v. East Cleveland,46
the Court focused on the liberty interest at stake when a city attempted
to prohibit extended family members from choosing to live in a single-
family home.4 7 The Court noted that it "has long recognized that free-
dom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.- 4' Numerous cases have relied on Meyer v. Nebraska49 and
41 See infra Section 1(4).
42 Sex, Lies and Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 551-552.
43 See Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 Berk. Wom. L.J. 134, 152-153
(1987-88); Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 681, 698-
699 (1990).
44 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
45 Id. at 534-535.
46 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
47 The East Cleveland ordinance would have forbidden a grandmother, her son, and her
two grandchildren, who were cousins, from living in the grandmother's home in a single-
family neighborhood. Id. at 496.
48 Id. at 499 (quoting Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640
(1974)).
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Pierce to protect freedom of choice regarding family life and childbear-
ing, parental rights to custody and companionship, and traditional
parental authority in childrearing and education.5" Thus, nonlegal par-
ents of alternative families could argue convincingly that this history of
constitutional protection for parents and families is available for exten-
sion to their alternative families.
B. Statutoiy Interpretation
Another option would be to define terms in state statutes that regu-
late parenthood in matters such as custody and visitation so that they
do not restrict parenthood to those related by blood or adoption.5'
Most state statutes do not define the term "parent" as used in custody
and visitation statutes.5 Whether a court is willing to interpret such a
statute to extend to nonlegal parents depends on the court's views on
statutory interpretation. For example, courts using a formal approach
to statutory interpretation interpret undefined terms such as "parent"
to refer to traditional family members unless explicit language compels
recognition of alternative families.5" Other courts, however, prefer a
functional approach which recognizes the paradigm of the nuclear fain-
49 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In that case, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that prohibited teaching of any language other than
English before the eighth grade. The Court found that the liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited such a restriction. The Court noted that liberty "denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of [individuals] to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of [their] own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free [people]." Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
50 See Cox, Refocusing Abortion Jurisprudence to Include the Woman: A Response to
Bopp and Coleson and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 543, 565
nn. 141-143 for a list of these cases and a further discussion of the liberty interest contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment.
51 State law controls the definition of family and parent. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404
(1975).
52 Each of the state statutes involved in the following cases did not exclusively define the
term "parent" to be restricted to natural or adoptive parents: Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77
N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal.
App.3d 831, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991); In re Interest of ZJ.H., 162 Wis.2d 1002, 471 N.W.2d
202 (1991).
53 Family Resemblance, supra note 2, at 1640-1641. These courts tend to believe that it is
the legislature's role to expand the definition of family beyond the traditional nuclear family.
Id. at 1647. Others refuse to interpret these terms broadly because they find inherent social
value in traditional institutions such as marriage and biological or adoptive parenthood and
believe that legal recognition should be granted by the state as an incentive to promote these
traditional relationships. Id.
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ily but recognizes alternative families as well.' These courts are less
deferential to the legislature and are willing to expand the definition of
family to incorporate social changes and meet the changing needs of
society.5 5 While the specific legislative history of a given statute may
not indicate that the legislature actually considered such an expansive
definition, the courts have been willing to expand the definition when
the cases were more "palatable. 5
6
C. Using Bartlett's or Polikoff 's Theories
As part of defining the term "parent" in these state statutes or in
expanding equitable theories to include nonlegal parents, courts may
find it useful to consider Bartlett's or Polikoff's theories to provide a
reasoned approach on which to base their analysis.5 7 While most state
legislatures probably did not have such intricate theories in mind when
leaving the term "parent" undefined, they must have intended to pro-
vide the courts with some flexibility. Otherwise, the legislature could
have defined "parent" in these statutes as the biological or adoptive
parents of the child.5" Therefore, in interpreting these undefined
terms, the courts could choose one of these theories as the basis for its
interpretation.
Bartlett argues that courts, in broadening the definition of parent
beyond exclusivity, should consider three factors in deciding whether
another adult should be recognized as the child's parent. Those factors
are (1) the adult should have had physical custody of the child for at
least six months, 9 (2) the adult must demonstrate that his or her
motive in seeking parental status is based on genuine care and concern
5 Id. at 1641.
55 Id. at 1647. These courts tend to find that alternative families provide the same social
benefits as traditional families and are willing to interpret statutory terms to include them. Id.
at 1647-1648.
56 Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978); Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska
1982). Both involved interpretation of visitation statutes in stepparent cases.
57 Bartlett, supra note 12; Polikoff, supra note 7. These two articles are extremely
insightful in laying the groundwork for courts to use in recognizing alternative families. This
article does not attempt to repeat the exhaustive analysis found in those articles. A reader
looking for a full historical and broad-based understanding of this field is well advised to
review those articles.
58 For example, the dissent in Alison D. suggested just this approach and incorporated some
of Bartlett's factors in its suggestion for defining "parent" in the New York statutes. 77
N.Y.2d at 659, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 590, 572 N.E.2d at 31 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
59 Bartlett, supra note 12, at 946-947. This factor helps the courts avoid inappropriately
conferring parental status on potential claimants, such as babysitters, neighbors, and distant
relatives.
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for the child,' and (3) the adult must establish that the relationship
with the child began with the consent of the child's legal parent or
under court order.6" Once the nonlegal parent establishes all three fac-
tors, the court should then decide whether and in what way to protect
that parent-child relationship.62 The courts in these cases should con-
sider each parent as eligible for primary custody, joint custody with
another parent, or visitation.6" In making its decision, the court should
focus on the child's welfare, rather than on the parent's rights, while
being careful not to assume that children cannot adjust to complex
associations or have more than one mother or father.' The court
should focus on the child's need to remain in contact with the adult,
rather than focusing on the amicability of the relationships between the
adults. 5
Polikoff advocates a doctrine of functional parenthood: parenthood
should be conferred on anyone in a functional parental relationship
created by a legally recognized parent with the intent that the relation-
ship be parental in nature.' Polikoff's doctrine does not require any
specific length of time in residence with the child because residency is
an imperfect proxy for quality of relationship with the child.6 Instead,
a mutuality requirement will screen out claimants such as babysitters
and neighbors without needing the additional residency requirement.68
Additionally, courts should not confer parental status on nonlegal par-
ents unless the legal parent consents to or cooperates in the formation
of an explicit parent-child relationship between that adult and his or
her child.6 1 Just as mutuality requires that the child consider the nonle-
60 Id. at 947. Bartlett refers to this factor as mutuality. She says that nonlegal parents need
to demonstrate a desire to act out of concern for the child, which is presumed to exist in
natural parents. Mutuality also ensures that the child perceives the adult's role to be that of a
parent, rather than as a temporary babysitter or companion under the direction of the natural
parent. Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 948.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 948-949.
66 Polikoff, supra note 7 at 483 n. 114. The primary problem with the intent criterion is
that, as the New York, Wisconsin, and California cases below illustrate, the legal parent may
consider the nonlegal parent to be a parent within the confines of an ongoing, intact family
unit while changing that belief once the family unit dissolves. Thus, some form of objective
evidence, rather than simply the subjective opinion of the legal parent, would be needed to
avoid the legal parent from claiming, in court, that he or she never considered the other adult
to be a parent to his or her child.
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gal parent to be a parent, so too the legal parent should also consider
the nonlegal parent to be a parent.7 0
Both of these scholars are as concerned as the courts with preserving
parental autonomy.7 ' Both of their theories protect this autonomy by
requiring the legal parent to have begun the relationship that exists
between nonlegal parent and child. By protecting parental autonomy
in this way, they ensure that the legal parent's status is not affected
without his or her actual participation. Either of their formulations
would provide courts with enough guidance to make decisions whether
and to what extent nonlegal parents from alternative families should be
able to continue their relationships with their children.
D. Equitable Theories
Finally, equitable theories are available that could be applied to all
alternative families that would provide the courts with the means to
resolve these cases so as to recognize and protect the relationship
between nonlegal parents and their children. Among these theories are
those of equitable parenthood, equitable estoppel, in loco parentis, and
de facto parenthood. Each of these theories has been used by various
courts to handle situations outside the traditional nuclear family. 2
Reviewing the cases that have used these theories establishes that
courts use them only to assist nonlegal parents who have a legal rela-
tionship, such as marriage, with the legal parent. The courts refuse to
use these doctrines to assist nonlegal parents who do not have some
type of legal relationship with the legal parent, such as parents in gay or
lesbian families or in unmarried heterosexual families.73
For example, the Michigan courts have developed the doctrine of
equitable parenthood to permit the husband of a legal parent to con-
tinue a parental relationship with his spouse's child. In one case, the
court of appeals determined that a husband was the equitable parent of
his spouse's four-year-old son and entitled to be considered a parent
for custody and visitation purposes.7 ' The court imposed three
requirements before recognizing the husband as an equitable parent:
(1) the husband and the child must mutually acknowledge a parental
relationship or the mother must have cooperated in developing that
70 Id.
71 Bartlett, supra note 12, at 944; Polikoff, supra note 7, at 491.
72 See infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
73 For a discussion of the rights of biological parents to a continued relationship with their
children when not married, see infra Section 11(a).
74 Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601, 602-603, 604 N.W.2d 516, 517-518 (1987).
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relationship over a period of time, (2) the husband wants to have paren-
tal rights, and (3) the husband is willing to take on the responsibility of
child support.75 The court based its decision on the fact that existing
case law would support imposing child support obligations on the hus-
band in such a case, and thus, it was reasonable to acknowledge corre-
sponding parental rights. 6
The courts could use this theory when faced with dissolution of alter-
native families beyond those based on marriage. Although a court
could distinguish other cases because the parties were not married, the
rationale for the court's decision establishing equitable parenthood
does not require that result." Rather than refashioning the test to
require marriage, the court, instead, could focus on the relationship
between the nonlegal parent and the child and on the legal parent's
cooperation in developing the relationship.7 ' Thus, a nonlegal parent
in an alternative family could meet all three prongs and have equitable
parenthood applied to recognize his or her relationship with the
child(ren) of the family.
Another possibility would be to use the doctrine of equitable estop-
pel to prevent or estop the legal parent from denying that a parental
relationship existed between the nonlegal parent and the child. Equita-
ble estoppel requires (1) action or non-action which induces (2) reli-
ance by another (3) to his or her detriment. 79 Courts primarily use this
doctrine to require a nonlegal parent to pay child support," although it
has been used to maintain the parent-child relationship between a non-
legal parent and his child. For example, one court acknowledged that
the doctrine could be used as a defense to prevent the mother from
claiming that her former husband was not her child's father.8 ' Thus,
75 Id. at 608-609, 604 N.W.2d at 519.
76 Id. at 610, 408 N.W.2d at 520.
77 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 485.
78 Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. at 608-609, 408 N.W.2d at 519.
79 In re Paternity of D.L.H., 142 Wis. 2d 606, 615-616, 419 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Ct. App.
1987)(citing Mowers v. City of St. Francis, 108 Wis. 2d 630, 633 (Ct. App. 1982)).
80 Polikoff, supra note 7, at 491. The New York courts have used the doctrine to enforce
parental support from a nonlegal parent when the child would not have entered the family
"but for" the actions of the nonlegal parent. Id. at 492-493 (citing Karin T. v. Michael T.,
127 Misc. 2d 14, 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fain. Ct. 1985), Werner v. Werner, 35 A.D.2d 50, 312
N.Y.S.2d 815 (2d Dep't 1970); Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup.
Ct. 1963). Other courts have also noted that the doctrine was used frequently to prevent
putative fathers from denying paternity. In re Paternity of D.L.H., 142 Wis. 2d at 615, 419
N.W.2d at 286 (citing In re Adoption of Young, 169 Pa. 141, 364 A.2d 1307 (1976)); A.M.N.
v. A.J.N., 141 Wis. 2d 99, 414 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1987).
81 In re Paternity of D.L.H., 142 Wis. 2d 606, 614-616, 419 N.W.2d 283, 286 (1987). The
husband claimed that he relied on the mother's representations by developing a parental
relationship with the child and by not pursuing adoption proceedings and that the mother had
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this theory would make it possible for nonlegal parents to prevent the
legal parent from claiming in court that only the legal relationship
between him or her and the child should be recognized.
Another option is using the doctrine of in loco parentis to protect the
parental relationship of nonlegal parents in alternative families. This
doctrine has been used frequently in stepparent cases.8 2 Under in loco
parentis doctrine, anyone who voluntarily assumes the status of parent
may incur support and education obligations.8 " This doctrine is usually
limited in stepparent cases because the common law has allowed the
stepparent to abandon in loco parentis status at any time, and particu-
larly when the relationship to the legal parent ends in divorce or
death. 4 However, courts have manipulated the common law or
stretched statutory law to allow for stepparent custody and visitation
even when the underlying marital relationship between the legal parent
and the stepparent has ended. 5
For example, one court construed a visitation statute allowing visita-
tion to "parents, grandparents, and other relatives "86 to include step-
parents standing in loco parentis8 7 Another court allowed visitation
based on a statute granting visitation for any "child of the marriage '
8 8
by finding that the stepchild was a child of the marriage due to the
stepfather's in loco parentis status.8 9 Finally, another court protected a
stepparent's right to visitation by finding that,just as it was against pub-
lic policy to destroy the relationship between a parent and child, it was
against public policy to destroy the relationship between a stepparent
standing in loco parentis and the child.9° The doctrine of in loco
parentis would make it possible for courts to prevent the destruction of
the relationship between the nonlegal parent and the child when their
alternative family dissolves.
A final possibility would be to use the doctrine of de facto
parenthood to protect the relationship between nonlegal parents and
their children. A de facto parent is one who, "on a day-to-day basis,
assumes the role of the parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physi-
obtained child support upon divorce by claiming that the child was one of the marriage.
Polikoff, supra note 7, at 497 n.190.
82 Bartlett, supra note 12, at 913.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 913-914.
85 Id. at 914-917 and cases cited therein.
86 Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(4)(1989).
87 Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978).
88 Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982).
89 Bartlett, supra note 12, at 915.
90 Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 175, 378 A.2d 879, 883 (1979).
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cal needs and his [or her] psychological need for affection and care."'"
The California Supreme Court noted the important role that the de
facto parent plays in a child's life and noted that "[tihe simple fact that
a person cares enough to seek and undertake to participate goes far to
suggest that the court would profit by hearing his [or her] views as to
the child's best interests." 2 The interests of de facto parents in contin-
uing the relationship with their child is a substantial one, recognized by
the courts of many jurisdictions, and deserving legal protection.9 3
As this summary has established, the judicial system would only need
to expand the factual scenarios under which these equitable theories
could be applied in order to provide protection and recognition to the
nonlegal parents of alternative families. Unfortunately for the individu-
als involved in these families, the courts have consistently refused to do
so. They have rejected repeated attempts by members of alternative
families to use those means currently available to prevent their parental
bonds from being ignored and destroyed. A review of the cases
rejecting these attempts illustrates the analytical gyrations the courts
have had to employ to deny their assistance.
II. COURTS' REFUSAL TO USE THE DOCTRINES AVAILABLE TO THEM TO
PROTECT NONLEGAL PARENTS IN ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES
This section reviews several cases that have considered and rejected
the options discussed above as means for finding protection and recog-
nition of the nonlegal parents of alternative families. The first portion
discusses the Supreme Court's refusal to broaden the definition of
parenthood and family that qualifies for constitutional protection under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The second por-
tion discusses various state courts' refusals to use statutory interpreta-
tion or existing theories to broaden the definition of parent. As this
discussion will show, the courts have been analytically unconvincing in
their attempts to justify these refusals.
91 In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 692 n.18, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 453 n.18, 523 P.2d 244, 253
n. 18 (1974). The California Supreme Court adopted this definition from Goldstein, Freud &
Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 98 (1973). Those authors referred to such a
person as a "psychological parent" and defined the day-to-day relationship as one established
through interaction, companionship, and interplay which fulfills the child's psychological
needs for a parent as well as his or her physical needs. Id.
92 In re B.G., II Cal. 3d at 692 n.18, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 453 n.18, 523 P.2d at 253 n.18.
93 Id. at 692-693, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 453, 523 P.2d at 253.
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A. Turning to the Supreme Court for Constitutional Protection of NonLegal
Parents in Alternative Families
Given the Supreme Court's traditional protection of both parents
and families under the due process clause, one would expect that those
seeking to protect alternative families could turn to the constitution to
obtain similar protection for their families. But the Court has shown
reluctance to provide this protection to alternative families. In Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas,94 the Court refused to protect an alternative family
consisting of six college students from the impact of a Village zoning
ordinance. That ordinance prohibited families other than those related
by blood, marriage, or adoption or consisting of two unrelated individ-
uals from living together in single-family neighborhoods. 95 In that
case, the Court was concerned about the disruptive influence that a
household of unrelated college students might cause in a single-family
neighborhood.
It has been argued that Belle Terre does not provide clear guidance on
how the Court might rule if faced with a similar suit by members of an
alternative family consisting of unmarried heterosexuals, gay men, or
lesbians and their children.9 6 These alternative families more closely
resemble the traditional nuclear family than unrelated college students.
Thus, if faced with facts involving such an alternative family, the Court
might provide it with similar constitutional protection.
9 7
The plurality opinion in Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D. ,9 how-
ever, evinces an unwillingness by the Court to recognize alternative
family arrangements, at least when they conflict with traditional fami-
lies, and seems to limit constitutional protection to the "unitary" or
"marital" family alone.9 9 Because this "pinched" definition of the fam-
ily'0 ° alone was found by the plurality to be entitled to constitutional
94 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
95 Id. at 2.
96 Cox, supra note 1, at 15. The Court has been willing to recognize some families beyond
the nuclear or extended family. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equity and
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1976), the Court recognized that deep, loving, and
interdependent relationships can exist in the absence of a blood relationship. The Court
stated that the foster family did deserve more recognition for its familial relationship than did
a "mere collection of unrelated individuals." Id. at 844-845. But the foster family was also
distinguishable from the "natural" family because it had its source in contractual
arrangements set up by the state. Cox, supra note 1, at 8 n.26.
97 Id.
98 Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
99 Id. at 124. The Court did acknowledge that some protection may be available to
unmarried heterosexuals living in a family with their biological children. Id. at 123 n.3.
100 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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protection, the Court will probably not lead the movement to recognize
alternative families and the parental rights of nonlegal parents within
those families.
The Supreme Court's decision in Michael H. is based on what the
plurality calls "extraordinary" facts.'' In May 1976, Carole and Gerald
were married and they established a home in California where they
resided as "husband and wife" when either of them was not out of the
country on business. In 1978, Carol became involved in an "adulterous
affair" with Michael, a neighbor.0 2 In September 1980, she conceived
a child, Victoria, who was born on May 11, 1981, with Gerald listed as
her father on the birth certificate. Gerald always acknowledged Victoria
as his child, although Carole told Michael that she thought he was her
father.
During the next three years, Victoria always lived with Carole, but
Carole lived with Gerald, Michael, and another man at different times.
In 1981, Carole and Michael took blood tests which established a
98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria's father. In 1982, Carole
visited Michael in St. Thomas, his principal place of business, and
Michael held Victoria out as his child while they were there.
In 1982, Michael filed a filiation suit in California Superior Court
because Carole had refused to allow Michael to visit Victoria. In March
1983, the court appointed a guardian ad litem to protect Victoria's
interests. Victoria then filed a cross-complaint stating that she wanted
to maintain filial relationships with "both" her fathers.' 0 3 From March
to July of 1983, Carole and Victoria lived with Gerald in New York, and
Carole filed a motion for summary judgment in May. However, in
August, Carole and Victoria returned to California and Michael. For
the next eight months, Carole, Michael, and Victoria lived together in
Carole's apartment when Michael was not in St. Thomas on business.
In April 1984, Carole and Michael signed a stipulation that Michael was
Victoria's natural father. A month later, Carole left Michael, returned
to Gerald, and told her attorneys not to file the stipulation. Carole,
101 Id. at 113.
102 The plurality insists on focusing on the "adulterous" nature of this relationship
throughout its opinion. Justice Brennan notes in his dissent that the plurality refers to
Michael as the "adulterous natural father" at least six times in its decision. Id. at 144
(Brennan, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that the plurality always refers to Carole as
the "mother" or "wife," even though it was she who was married, and thus committing
adultery, at the time of her involvement with Michael.
103 The plurality rejects the premise of her complaint by stating that "California law, like
nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood." Id. at 118.
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Gerald, and Victoria continue to live together in New York along with
two additional children of Carole and Gerald.
In May 1984, Michael and Victoria sought visitation rights for
Michael. The psychologist involved in the case recommended that Car-
ole retain sole custody but that Michael be allowed contact with Victo-
ria on a restricted visitation schedule. The court concurred and
ordered Michael to have visitation pendent lite. In October 1984, Ger-
ald, who had intervened in the suit, moved for summary judgment
based on Cal. Evid. Code § 621 which provides that "the issue of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclu-
sively presumed to be a child of the marriage."'" The only way to
rebut the presumption is for the husband or wife to challenge it within
two years of the child's birth, based on blood tests.10 5 The natural
father does not have any way to rebut the presumption himself.
In January 1985, the superior court granted Gerald's motion for
summary judgment based on affidavits submitted by Gerald and Carole
demonstrating that they were cohabitating at the time of Victoria's con-
ception and birth and that Gerald was neither sterile nor impotent.
The court denied Michael's and Victoria's challenges to the statute as
unconstitutional and denied their motions for continued visitation
under Cal. Civ. Code § 4601.1"6 The court found that visitation would
"violat[e] the intention of the Legislature by impugning the integrity of
the family unit."'0 7 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the judg-
ment of the superior court and upheld the constitutionality of the stat-
ute.'08 The court also denied Michael visitation rights.1 9 The
California Supreme Court denied discretionary review.
104 Cal. Evid. Code § 621(a) (West Supp. 1991).
105 Cal. Evid. Code § 62 1(c) and (d) (West Supp. 1991). In order for the wife to be allowed
to rebut the presumption, the natural father must have filed an affidavit asserting paternity.
Id.
106 Cal. Civ. Code § 4601 (West 1991) states:
Reasonable visitation rights [shall be awarded] to a parent unless it is shown that
the visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. In the
discretion of the court, reasonable visitation may be granted to any other person
having an interest in the welfare of the child.
107 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116.
10s 191 Cal. App. 3d 995, 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1987).
109 Id. at 1012-1013, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 825. It based its decision on the case of Vincent B. v.
Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1987), which held that "once an assertion of
biological paternity is 'determined to be legally impossible' under § 621, visitation against the
wishes of the mother should be denied under § 4601." Id. at 627-628, 179 Cal. Rptr at 13.
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The plurality focused on the substantive due process aspect of
Michael's claim "to be declared the father of Victoria""10 and framed
his argument as follows: "because he has established a parental rela-
tionship with Victoria, protection of Gerald's and Carole's marital
union is an insufficient state interest to support termination of that rela-
tionship.""' The plurality denied his claim, noting that before Michael
could be successful, he had to establish a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in his relationship with Victoria." 2
Michael must have felt confident in asserting that his relationship
with Victoria was a liberty interest protected by the due process clause
because he had no fewer than four Supreme Court decisions on which
to base this assertion. Starting with Stanley v. Illinois," -  Michael
assumed that he had over twenty years of established Supreme Court
precedent protecting the rights of unwed fathers to maintain relation-
ships with their children. 14
Justice White, in dissent, explained the basis for Michael's assump-
tion. He reviewed the Court's decision in Stanley which recognized an
unwed, biological father's right to maintain a legal relationship with his
illegitimate children." 5 There, the Court held that the due process
clause entitled the biological father to a hearing on parental fitness
110 The plurality noted immediately before that California law "makes no provision for
dual fatherhood." It argued, thus, that Michael was trying to be declared Victoria's only
father. However, the dissent pointed out that all Michael wanted was to be given a chance to
establish his paternity. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 148 n.7 (BrennanJ., dissenting). Whether any
rights would flow from the status as legal father of Victoria would depend on the trial court's
determination of Victoria's best interests. Id. at 156; See Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 4601 (West
Supp. 1989).
By construing Michael's claim as one of being declared THE father of Victoria, rather than as
being given a chance to establish his paternity, the plurality can avoid the procedural due
process issue raised by this case and, thus, more easily side-step the Stanley line of cases. 491
U.S. at 121. It noted that its prior irrebuttable presumption cases led it to analyze this case as
calling into question "not the adequacy of procedures but . . . the adequacy of the 'fit'
between the classification and the policy that the classification serves." Id. Thus, the plurality
rejected Michael's procedural due process challenge and analyzed his claim under substantive
due process. Justice Brennan rejected the majority's argument that this was simply a
substantive due process claim, and, instead, argued that California was required to provide
Michael with a hearing to prove his paternity of Victoria. Id. at 151-156 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
II Id. at 121.
112 Id.
113 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
114 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
115 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 158. In Stanley, the unwed father, Peter Stanley, had provided
care and support for his three children and their mother off and on for 18 years. Upon the
death of Joan Stanley, the children automatically became wards of the state pursuant to an
Illinois law which presumptively declared unwed fathers to be "unfit" parents. Stanley
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before his children could be taken away from him and rejected "the
State's treatment of Stanley 'not as a parent but as a stranger to his
children.' "116
White then turned to Quilloin where the Court expressly recognized
due process rights in the biological father, while holding that those
rights were not impermissibly burdened by applying the best interests
of the child standard." 7 He then considered Caban where the Court,
interpreting the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, invali-
dated a statute allowing an unwed father's children to be adopted by
their mother and her husband without the father's consent." 8 Finally,
consideration of this line of cases was completed with Lehr, where the
court held against the father but stated that "fathers who have partici-
pated in raising their illegitimate children and have developed a rela-
tionship with them have constitutionally protected parental rights.""' 9
White noted that:
Indeed, the Court in Lehr suggested that States must provide a
biological father of an illegitimate child the means by which he
may establish his paternity so that he may have the opportunity
to develop a relationship with his child. The court upheld a step-
parent adoption over the natural father's objections, but
acknowledged that "the existence or nonexistence of a substan-
tial relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion
in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests
challenged Illinois' authority to constitutionally deprive him of custody of his children,
without first affording him an individualized hearing as to parental fitness.
116 Id. (citing Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648).
117 Id. at 158 (citing Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255). In Quilloin, the mother of a child consented
to the adoption of her child by her husband, who was not the child's biological father. Under
Georgia law, the adoption was permissible if the mother gave her consent; consent by the
unwed father was only required if he had formally legitimated his child. At issue was whether
the constitutionally protected liberty interest recognized in Stanley extended to an unwed
father who never shouldered any of the significant responsibilities of fatherhood.
118 Id. at 158-159 (citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 380). Like Quilloin, Caban involved the
constitutionality of a New York law which required the mother's, but not the father's, consent
to adoption. Unlike Mr. Quilloin, however, Abdiel Caban had lived with his children and their
mother, Maria Mohammed, for approximately five years, and continued to see them even after
he and Maria ceased living together. The court distinguished the rights of unwed fathers who
had never maintained a relationship with their children, and the rights of fathers, such as
Peter Stanley and Abdiel Caban, who had maintained such a relationship.
119 Id. at 158 (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-262). In Lehr v. Robertson, the putative father
claimed an adoption order in favor of the child's natural mother and her husband was invalid
because he had never received advance notice of the adoption proceedings. Addressing the
issue of parental rights once again, the court carefully analyzed the extent to which Mr. Lehr
had availed himself of the opportunity to establish and maintain an ongoing relationship with
his child. The court concluded that he had not demonstrated a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood, and absent his assumption of such parental duties, the mere
fact of his biological link did not, by itself, merit equivalent constitutional protection.
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of the child." There, however, the father had never established a
custodial, personal or financial relationship with his child.
120
In particular, Justice White noted the factual basis for Michael's
assumption that he would be entitled to constitutional protection given
those previous cases. Distinguishing Michael's case from Quilloin and
Lehr where the court found that the unwed fathers in those cases did
not have a liberty interest in protecting their relationships with their
children, White reasoned:
In the case now before us, Michael H. is not a father unwilling
to assume his responsibilities as a parent. To the contrary, he is
a father who has asserted his interests in raising and providing
for his child since the very time of the child's birth. In contrast
to the father in Lehr, Michael H. had begun to develop a relation-
ship with his daughter. There is no dispute on this point.
Michael contributed to the child's support. Michael and Victoria
lived together (albeit intermittently, given Carole's itinerant
lifestyle). There is a personal and emotional relationship
between Michael and Victoria, who grew up calling him
"Daddy." Michael H. held Victoria out as his daughter and con-
tributed to the child's financial support. 1
21
White then applied the test from Lehr to the undisputed facts.'
22
"When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the respon-
sibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rear-
ing of his child,' his interest in personal contact with his child acquires
substantial protection under the due process clause."' 121 White noted
that the focus should be the relationship between father and child, not
the relationship between father and mother. 124 White concluded that Michael
H. "more than meets the mark" in establishing the constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest recognized in the Stanley/Lehr line of cases.'
25
In order to avoid the impact of this twenty-year line of precedent, the
plurality analyzed Michael's interest solely in relation to the interest the
state of California has in protecting the unitary, marital family. This
analysis is the most threatening aspect of the opinion with respect to
any possible protection for alternative families which the court might
provide in the future. If the plurality had not shown its willingness to
protect the unitary, marital family alone, given the "extraordinary
facts" of the case, it would be possible in the future to confine Michael
120 Id. at 159 (citations omitted).
121 Id. at 159-160.
122 Id. at 160.
123 Id. (citing Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261).
124 Id. at 160.
125 Id.
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H. to its facts. It would then be possible to assume that Michael H.
would not inflict any permanent damage on the Stanley line of cases
establishing a protected liberty interest of unwed fathers in maintaining
relationships with their children. More importantly, Michael H. could
be distinguished in the same way as Belle Terre, and it could be assumed
that it does not necessarily indicate an unwillingness by the Court to
protect alternative families if faced with such a factual scenario.
The plurality's efforts to side-step those cases, however, established
ominous dicta.' 26 The plurality began by looking at the means the
Court has used in the past to "limit and guide interpretation" of the
due process clause's liberty interest. 27 It stated that, in order to be
entitled to protection, a liberty interest must both be fundamental and
"traditionally protected by our society."' 28 The plurality's method of
determining which liberty interests have been traditionally protected
provided it with the lever necessary to push aside the Stanley/Lehr line
of cases. It reinterpreted those cases, finding that they did not establish
a protected liberty interest in "biological fatherhood plus an estab-
lished parental relationship", factors that the plurality conceded "exist
in the present case as well."' 29
Instead of this "distortion," the plurality believed that those cases
rested "upon the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too
strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop
within the unitary family."' 0 Turning to the Court's decision in Moore
126 This is dicta because only justices Scalia and Rhenquist join in this analysis. While this
language could be cited as precedent in a later opinion, because it is a plurality opinion, it is
not an authoritative statement of the Court's position on the constitutional issue involved. 3
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 1397 (Leonard W. Levy ed, 1986).
127 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122.
128 Id. The plurality defended itself from Justice Brennan's assertion that its practice of
limiting the Due Process Clause to traditionally protected interests turns it into a redundancy,
Id. at 141, by arguing that its purpose is to prevent future generations from lightly casting
aside important traditional values-not to enable this Court to invent new ones. Id. at 122,
n.2. Finding this as the only liberty interest protected seems to run headlong into the notion
of the Constitution as a living, breathing document capable of leading our nation into the
future and encountering every changing demand of a growing, changing society. See e.g.,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682 (1952)(Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).
129 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.
Is0 Id. at 123. Justice Brennan disagreed with that assertion.
The only difference between these two sets of relationships, however, is the fact
of marriage. The plurality, indeed, expressly recognizes that marriage is the
critical fact in denying Michael a constitutionally protected stake in his
relationship with Victoria.... However, the very premise of Stanley and the cases
following it is that marriage is not decisive in answering the question whether
the Constitution protects the parental relationship under consideration. ... It is
important to remember, moreover, that in Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr, the putative
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v. East Cleveland,I13 the plurality stated that "[o]ur decisions establish
that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition."'
' 3 2
It then framed the issue so as to deny Michael any constitutional pro-
tection and to protect Gerald and Carole's "unitary family":
Thus, the legal issue in the present case reduces to whether
the relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and
Victoria has been treated as a protected family unit under the
historic practices of our society, or whether on any other basis it
has been accorded special protection. We think it impossible to find
that it has. In fact, quite to the contrary, our traditions have protected
the marital family (Gerald, Carole, and the child they acknowledge to be
theirs) against the sort of claim Michael asserts. 133
Having framed the issue this way, the plurality easily moved through
the next several pages of its opinion verifying that California's irrebut-
table presumption has a long history and traditional place in Anglo-
American jurisprudence."3 4
The Court looked to the legal tradition of protecting and presuming
the legitimacy of children born into marital families as the basis for
finding California's presumption constitutional. It noted that the pre-
sumption could traditionally be rebutted only by showing that the hus-
band was incapable of procreation or had been "beyond the four seas"
during the period of conception.13 5 It concluded that the policy under-
lying the severe restrictions on rebutting the presumption "appears to
have been an aversion to declaring children illegitimate . . . and likely
making them wards of the state."'136 A secondary policy concern was
promoting the peace and tranquility of the state and the family.' 7
The plurality then made its analytical error. It began by finding
nothing in the older cases recognizing a natural father's right to main-
father's demands would have disrupted a "unitary family" as the plurality
defines it; in each case, the husband of the child's mother sought to adopt the
child over the objections of the natural father. Significantly, our decisions in
those cases in no way relied on the need to protect the marital family. Hence the
plurality's claim that Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr were about the "unitary
family," as that family is defined by today's plurality, is surprising indeed.
Id. at 144-145 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
132 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123-124 (citing Moore, 431 U.S. at 503).
133 Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
134 Id. at 124-127.
'35 Id. at 124.
136 Id. at 125 (citations omitted).
137 Id.
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tain a relationship with a child born within the mother's existing mar-
riage to another man. 3 8 It then considered more recent cases which do
not generally acknowledge "the ability of a person in Michael's position
to claim paternity."'3 9 This lack of traditional protection for the very
claim that Michael made, in the context of these "extraordinary" facts,
was enough for Justices Scalia and Rhenquist to conclude that
Michael's relationship with Victoria was not deserving of due process
protection. At this point, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy abandoned
the plurality opinion. 4 °
Scalia and Rhenquist asserted that no case existed that awarded
"substantive parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived
within and born into an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the
child."'' Since no previous case had granted the protection Michael
sought, he had no basis for claiming "the stuff of which fundamental
rights qualifying as liberty interests are made."' 42
In footnote 6, Justices Scalia and Rhenquist asserted that they must
look for "historical traditions specifically relating to the rights of an adul-
terous natural father, rather than inquiring more generally 'whether
parenthood is an interest that historically has received our attention
and protection' " in deciding whether Michael's claim was deserving of
constitutional protection as a fundamental liberty interest. 43 In deter-
mining which liberty interests are protected by the due process clause,
they argued that they should
refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition pro-
tecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be iden-
tified. If, for example, there were no societal tradition, either
way, regarding the rights of the natural father of a child adulter-
ously conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible) rea-
son from, the traditions regarding natural fathers in general.
But there is such a more specific tradition, and it unqualifiedly
denies protection to such a parent.' 44
Justices Scalia and Rhenquist then turned to Bowers v. Hardwick 141 to
support their analysis. 146 In Bowers, the Court upheld a Georgia statute
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
141 Id. at 127.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 127 n.6. (emphasis added).
144 Id.
'45 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
146 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6. They also noted that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
supported their conclusion because the majority there spent one-fifth of its opinion negating
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prohibiting sodomy and supported its decision by focusing on the
numerous state laws that prohibited sodomy at the time the fourteenth
amendment was ratified.' 47 The Bowers majority believed that, in light
of those laws, "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious."' 48 Thus, no fundamental right
to engage in gay sodomy existed because of the historical proscriptions
against those activities. 49 Similarly, Scalia and Rhenquist reasoned
that no fundamental right existed for a natural father to claim constitu-
tional protection of his relationship with his daughter who was born
into her mother's marriage to another man.1 50
To use this much-maligned decision to support their reasoning
shows the lack of support that Scalia and Rhenquist's reasoning engen-
ders. ' l They then proceeded to make the same analytical error that
the Bowers majority made. Just as the majority in Bowers erred by focus-
ing too narrowly on whether constitutional protection existed for the
practice of sodomy, so too Justices Scalia and Rhenquist focused too
narrowly on whether constitutional protection existed for an adulterous
father to maintain a relationship with his child. In Bowers, the Court
erred by focusing on the practice regulated by the Georgia statute
instead of recognizing the constitutional importance of protecting an
individual's choice to engage in that practice in connection with con-
the proposition that there was a longstanding tradition of laws proscribing tradition. Id. The
reliance on Roe is misplaced. Roe's protection of women's right to choose an abortion is based
on the fundamental right of privacy and the liberty interest to make fundamental choices
affecting an individual. See, Cox, supra note 50, at 575. For a broader discussion of the
liberty interest in making these choices, see Cox, supra note 50, at 570-575.
147 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-194 The Bowers court noted that all but 5 of the 37 states had
criminal sodomy statutes, that all 50 states had those laws before 1961, and that 24 states and
the District of Columbia continue to have those laws on their statute books. Id.
148 Id. at 194 (emphasis in original). It should be noted that this same claim has been
raised as a basis for overturning the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) to
protect a woman's right to choose an abortion. See Bopp and Coleson, The Right To
Abortion: Anomalous, Absolute, and Ripe for Reversal, 3 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 181, 220-221
(1989). For a reply to that argument, see, Cox, supra note 50, at 573-577.
149 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
150 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 (citations omitted).
151 For a list of some of the articles condemning the Court's decision in Bowers, see Cox,
supra note 50, at 575 n.201. Additionally, in an October 23, 1990 telephone interview,
former Justice Powell was quoted as saying, "I think I probably made a mistake in that one,"
referring to his concurring opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, which provided the crucial "swing
vote" for the majority 5-4 decision. Further elaborating on his misgivings over the Bowers
decision, Mr. Powell stated that, "When I had the opportunity to reread the opinion a few
months later, I thought the dissent had the better of the arguments." Agneshwar, Ex-Justice
Says He May Have Been Wrong; Powell on Sodomy, National LawJournal, Nov. 5, 1990, at
3.
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cepts of privacy and personhood.' 52 The question in Bowers should not
have been whether the practice of gay sodomy was legal or illegal his-
torically, but rather whether the Constitution protects an individual's
choice to practice gay sodomy.' 53 So too, in this case, the question
should not have been whether adulterous fathers' relationships with
their children have been protected historically, but rather whether the
Constitution protects a biological parent's right to maintain a relation-
ship with his or her child.
This analytical error was noted by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
who, although concurring in the result, refused to endorse this analy-
sis. 54 Justice O'Connor noted that footnote six of the plurality opinion
sketched a mode of historical analysis used in identifying liberty inter-
ests protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause that
she found possibly inconsistent with earlier decisions, including Gris-
wold v. Connecticut'55 and Eisenstadt v. Baird.'56  She noted that there
had been occasions when the Court had not used the "most specific
level available," but instead had characterized relevant traditions pro-
tecting rights at levels of greater generality.' 57 She concluded that she
would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a sin-
gle mode of historical analysis.'5 8
In looking to the Court for recognition and protection for members
of alternative families, the plurality's analysis, and even more its tone,
are disheartening. Using Michael H. as a predictor for future court deci-
152 Cox, supra note 50, at 577.
153 Id. at 576.
That fundamental choice is protected by the right to privacy, just as the choice
whether to possess obscene materials in one's home, the choice whether to use
contraceptives, the choice to marry interracially, and the choice to have an
abortion, among others, are protected by the privacy right. Both Justice
Blackmun and Justice Stevens in their Bowers dissents note this misconstruction
of the constitutional question .... As Justice Blackmun concludes, 'we have
recognized that a necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose
how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will
make different choices.'
Id. at 576-577.
154 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) where those justices
note their refusal to join in the plurality's analysis contained in footnote 6.
155 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
156 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
157 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part)(citations omitted). For
examples, she pointed to Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709 (1987)(opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1511 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132. She turned to Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 542, 544 (1961) to support her conclusion. Id.
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sions, one would have to expect that the Court may conclude that the
legal system is free to refuse to recognize and protect alternative fami-
lies and nonlegal parents simply because they have never been legally
recognized in the past. In previous times, when fewer of these families
existed, such a "pinched conception" of the family may not have caused
significant harm. But currently, with the large number of alternative
families and the variety that exists among them, this willingness by the
Court to avoid current realities by narrowly interpreting the due pro-
cess clause is troubling at best.
In particular, the tone and analysis of the plurality decision does not
bode well for expansion of constitutional protection of alternative fami-
lies who do not fit this "pinched" definition of the family. Even if the
plurality had simply refused to recognize Carole, Michael, and Victoria
as a family,'59 its construction of liberty interests and its focus on tradi-
tion rejects any hope for constitutional protection of some alternative
families. No one can argue that gay or lesbian families have been tradi-
tionally recognized in this society. And while the plurality did seem
willing to recognize a "household of unmarried parents and their chil-
dren" as a family," 6 that minor expansion to unmarried heterosexual
couples, living together, with children born to those two biological par-
ents, does nothing to protect gay, lesbian, or stepparent families. This
lack of constitutional protection has been compounded by various state
courts' refusals to provide statutory or equity-based protection to alter-
native families when given the opportunity to do so.
B. Turning to State Courts for Equity-Based Protection of Nonlegal Parents
in Alternative Families
Given the lack of constitutional protection for alternative families
and the fact that family law is considered to be a state law concern,' 6'
many alternative family members have turned to the state courts in
attempts to obtain protection and recognition of their families. As the
first section of this article established, the courts have numerous statu-
tory and equitable bases available to them that could be used to provide
this protection and recognition. Although the courts have shown some
willingness to recognize parental bonds between stepparents and their
children, alternative families that are not marriage-based have received
virtually no protection from state courts.
159 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3.
160 Id.
161 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
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This section reviews recent decisions from the courts of New York,
Wisconsin, and California that refused to use any of these avenues to
protect the nonlegal parents and children of alternative families. Those
cases are In the Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M.,16 In re Interest of
Z.J.H.,16s and Nancy S. v. Michelle G."6 Close examination of each of
these decisions establishes the legal maneuvers and analytical weakness
employed by the courts to avoid a problem that faces them in increas-
ing seriousness and numbers. Rather than using the options that are
available to them, these courts have abdicated their responsibility to
those families turning to the court system for assistance.
1. In the Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M.
Perhaps the most surprising case of the three was the New York
Court of Appeals decision in In the Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M.
which held that a lesbian co-parent did not have standing to seek visita-
tion rights with the child that she and her partner shared.'6 5 The court,
by narrowly interpreting the definition of parent in section 70,166 held
that Alison D. was not a parent within the statute capable of seeking
visitation rights.
In that case, Alison D. and Virginia M. began their relationship in
September 1977 and started living together in March 1978. Two years
later, they decided to have a child together and agreed that Virginia
would be artificially inseminated. As part of planning for their child,
they agreed that they would share all rights and responsibilities for the
child jointly.'6 7 In July 1981, their son was born and named A.D.M.,
with his middle name the same as Alison's last name and his last name
the same as Virginia's.' 68
162 In the Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d
586 (1991).
163 In re Interest of Z.J.H., 162 Wis. 2d 1002, 471 N.W.2d 202 (1991).
164 Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1st Dist. 1991).
165 This decision was surprising because, just two years earlier, the same court in Braschi v.
Stahl Associates, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) defined
"family" under the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 2204.6(d) to
include a family established by two gay men. The landlord was attempting to evict one of the
men who had lived with his partner in their rent-controlled apartment for over 11 years after
his partner, who was the only person on the lease, died of Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (A.I.D.S.). Thus, because the statute allowed family members to remain in rent-
controlled apartments after the death of the family member who signed the lease, he was
allowed to retain the apartment.
166 N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 70 (1988).
167 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 655, 572 N.E.2d at 28, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
168 Id.
1991]
Journal of Law & Politics
For the next two years and four months, the two women raised
A.D.M. jointly and shared the duties of caring for and raising him.'69
Alison and Virginia then ended their relationship. They established a
visitation schedule with Alison seeing A.D.M. several times a week and
continuing to pay one-half of the mortgage and other household
expenses. 17' A.D.M. referred to both Virginia and Alison as
"mommy."'' 7 ' Alison continued to visit A.D.M. until 1986, when Vir-
ginia bought out Alison's interest in the family home and began to
restrict visitation.1 72 At this time, A.D.M. was six years old. In 1987,
Alison moved to Ireland for her career and tried to continue her rela-
tionship with her son but Virginia returned all her presents and let-
ters.17 3 At that point, Alison went to the legal system in an attempt to
obtain continued visitation with her son. All three courts that heard the
case decided against her.
In a one-page decision, the New York Court of Appeals interpreted
the term "parent" in section 70 of the Domestic Relations Law to
exclude Alison.' 74 The Court focused on Alison's concession that she
was not A.D.M.'s biological or adoptive parent and referred to her as "a
biological stranger" to the child she helped raise for six years. 175 It
rejected the claim that she was a "de facto" parent stating that it was
insufficient to provide standing under the statute.176
The court's refusal to recognize Alison's relationship with A.D.M.
and her status as a nonlegal parent was obvious from its choice of lan-
guage in rejecting her claim. The court quoted Ronald FF. v Cindy
GG. ,177 stating "[ilt has been recognized that, as between a parent and a
third person, parental custody of a child may not be displaced absent
169 Id. According to the Appellate Division's opinion in this case, the two women shared
the household and child support expenses before, during, and after the pregnancy. In the
Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 155 A.D.2d 11, 552 N.Y.S.2d 321 (2d Dep't 1990).
Additionally, during the two years following A.D.M.'s birth, Alison assisted in his care,
including transporting him to school and taking care of his medical needs. Id.




174 The statute states that "either parent may apply to Supreme Court for a writ of habeas
corpus to have such minor child brought before such court; and [the court] may award the
natural guardianship, charge and custody of such child to either parent . . . as the case may
require... ." N.Y. Dom. Rel § 70 (1988).
175 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 654, 572 N.E.2d at 28, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
176 Id. at 656, 572 N.E.2d at 29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
177 Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 70 N.Y.2d 141, 144, 511 N.E.2d 75, 77, 517 N.Y.S.2d 932,
933 (1987).
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grievous cause or necessity."17 1 It stated that "to allow the courts to
award visitation ... to a third person would necessarily impair the par-
ents' right to custody and control" and concluded that Alison had "no
right" to attempt to displace Virginia's choice of what was in the child's
best interests. 179 Finally, the majority declined Alison's "invitation to
read the term parent in section 70 to include categories of nonparents
who have developed a relationship with a child or who have had prior
relationships with a child's parents and wish to continue visitation with
the child."' 8 °
Only once during the opinion did the majority pause to recognize the
impact that its ruling may have on the countless children and nonlegal
parents in A.D.M.'s and Alison's positions.
While one may dispute in an individual case whether it would be
beneficial to a child to have continued contact with a nonparent,
the Legislature did not in section 70 give such nonparent the
opportunity to compel a fit parent to allow them to do so.181
While conceding that visitation may be in the best interests of a given
child, it refused to interpret the controlling statute to protect that
interest.
The dissent focused on this refusal. Visitation and custody matters
are predicated in most states on achieving the best interests of the child
involved.'8 2 The dissent pointed out that the court of appeals itself had
declared that this standard should be controlling.
178 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 656, 572 N.E.2d at 29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (emphasis added).
The court uses this custody case to deny visitation rights to Alison D. by stating that allowing
the courts to award visitation, which is "a limited form of custody," to a third person would
impair the parents' right to custody and control. The dissent noted that the majority
incorrectly ignored the "significant distinction between visitation and custody proceedings."
Id. at 660, 572 N.E.2d at 31, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 590 (Kaye, J., dissenting). It noted that custody
disputes implicate a parent's right to rear a child and must be based on lack of fitness of the
custodial parent. The majority used a custody case to brush away Alison's visitation request
and the custody standard (Alison's concession that Virginia is not unfit) to deny her case. Id.
at 656, 572 N.E.2d at 29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 588. The dissent noted that any concern about
parental fitness is irrelevant in visitation proceedings. Id. at 661, 569 N.E.2d at 32, N.Y.S.2d
at 591. It pointed out that the majority's application of the "extraordinary circumstances"
test in Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d
821, 823 (1976) to a visitation case "closes the door on all consideration of the child's best
interest in visitation proceedings ... unless the petitioner is a biological parent." Alison D., 77
N.Y.2d at 661, 569 N.E.2d at 32, N.Y.S.2d at 591.




182 At least half of the states have statutes incorporating this standard. H. Clark, Jr., § 19.4
The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 797 (2d ed. 1988). Nearly all judicial
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As the court wrote in Matter of Bennett v. Jefreys, even in recog-
nizing the superior right of a biological parent to the custody of
her child, "when there is a conflict, the best interest of the child has
always been regarded as superior to the right of parental custody.... This
shifting reflects more the modem principle that a child is a per-
son, and not a subperson over whom the parent has an absolute
possessory interest."'
' 83
In refusing to allow this standard to guide its decision, the majority
"turn[ed] its back on a tradition of reading section 70 so as to promote
the welfare of the children ... ",184
The dissent argued that the court was empowered to define parent in
a way that would focus on the best interests of the child in these cases
and should have taken this opportunity to do so. It noted that "it is
surely within our competence to do so" given the statute's objectives,
the court's power, and the fact that the majority's decision "absolutely"
forecloses considering the child's best interests.
18 5
Although the dissent did not include a definition of "parent" that
would satisfy the mandate of recognizing the child's best interests, it
pointed to factors that would be important. "It should be required that
the relationship with the child came into being with the consent of the
biological or legal parent, and that the petitioner at least have had joint
custody of the child for a significant period of time. ' ' The dissent
relied on the court's decision in Braschi v. Stahl Associates, which defined
"family" under rent-control statutes, to support its belief that other fac-
tors could be added to those listed above to protect all relevant inter-
ests involved in these proceedings.
In fact, it was the decision in Braschi which had led activists for alter-
native families to believe that the New York Court of Appeals might
have been the first state supreme court to recognize the bonds between
children and nonlegal parents living in alternative families. Braschi had
shown the court's willingness to step beyond a traditional, narrow
interpretation of undefined statutory terms such as "family" or "par-
ent." The dissent in the appellate division best explained why the
majority was incorrect in narrowly defining "parent," given the prece-
dent set in Braschi.
discussions of custody cases begin with the statement that custody should be awarded to
promote the child's best interests. Id. at § 19.1.
183 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 660, 572 N.E.2d at 31, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 590 (emphasis added).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 662, 572 N.E.2d at 32, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
186 Id.
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The majority's holding to the contrary rests upon a narrow appli-
cation of the term "parent" which is inconsistent with relevant
holdings of other jurisdictions and with the progressive and realistic
definition of the term "family" recently adopted by the Court of
Appeals in Braschi v. Stahl Associates.... The governing criterion,
as always, is the best interests of the child. Accordingly, in con-
struing the statutory term "parent", the court must strive to
avoid rigid analysis and temper its inquiry by considering the
best interests of the child under the circumstances presented.
18 7
It then turned to the language of Braschi which one would have pre-
sumed would have been instructive in deciding Alison D.
The decision in Braschi centered on the court of appeals' interpreta-
tion of the term "family" as it was used in the New York City rent and
eviction regulations.' The court noted that statutes should be inter-
preted to avoid "objectionable consequences and to prevent hardship
or injustice" and that when two constructions are possible, "the conse-
quences that may result from the different interpretations should be
considered."'8 9 Despite an argument by the landlord that the term
"family" should be defined only to include "traditional, legally recog-
nized familial relationships,"'' 9 0 the court refused to "rigidly" restrict
the definition of family to those people who formalized their relation-
ship by obtaining a marriage certificate or adoption order.'' In lan-
guage that the Alison D. court could easily have used in deciding that
case, the court looked beyond legally defined relationships with a real-
istic eye.
The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest
on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find
its foundation in the reality of family life. In the context of evic-
tion, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family
includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long
term and characterized by an emotional and financial commit-
ment and interdependence. This view comports both with our society's
traditional concept of 'family" and with the expectations of individuals
who live in such nuclear units. 19
2
187 Alison D., 155 A.D.2d 11, 16-17, 552 N.Y.S.2d 321, 325 (2d Dep't 1990)(emphasis
added).
188 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 2204.6(d). The statute states that when a rent-control tenant dies, the
landlord may not evict "the surviving spouse ...or some other member of the deceased
tenant's family who has been living with the tenant."
189 Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 74 N.Y.2d 201, 208, 543 N.E.2d 49, 51-52, 544 N.Y.S.2d
784, 786-787 (1989).
190 Id. at 209, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
191 Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
192 Id. (emphasis added).
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The court concluded that when the legislature used the term "family,"
it intended to extend protection to those in households having "all of
the normal familial characteristics" and thus, Braschi should be given
the opportunity to establish that he and his partner lived in such a
household. 9 '
The court's amnesia less than two years after its decision in Braschi is
hard to comprehend. The court indicated that statutory interpretation
left room to acknowledge the realistic situation of alternative families in
housing matters. Surely that room also exists within parent-child rela-
tionships. Indeed, with the additional concern of protecting the best
interests of the child, it is hard to understand how the court could
define parent so narrowly. While there are potential difficulties in
preventing too broad an expansion of adults seeking visitation rights,
the court could easily use any of the equitable doctrines or the stan-
dards asserted by Polikoff or Bartlett to resolve this concern. The fear
of drawing distinctions based on factual considerations should not keep
the courts from using their judicial powers to protect the children and
nonlegal parents of alternative families."94
2. In re Interest of Z.J.H.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court followed the lead of the New York
Court of Appeals. The court rejected Wendy Sporleder's request for
standing to seek custody or visitation of Z.J.H. and held that the co-
parenting agreement signed between her and her partner, Janice Her-
mes, was unenforceable.
Wendy and Janice lived together as "companions"'' 95 for eight years.
Wendy tried to become pregnant through artificial insemination but
was unsuccessful. They then agreed thatJanice would adopt a child. In
March 1988, Z.J.H., two months old at that time, was placed in their
home by an adoption agency. Wendy provided primary care for ZJ.H.
'93 Id.
194 One argument that can be made for restricting the definition of "parent" is that it
encourages people in alternative families to pursue traditional family relationships with their
children through marriage and adoption. While this is an option for heterosexual couples,
lesbians and gay men have been precluded from marrying or adopting children jointly and
thus their conduct will not be changed by such a restrictive definition. See also, infra note 301
for discussion of marriage laws and the lesbian and gay community.
195 In ZJ.H., the women lived together as partners for eight years but the court simply
refers to them as companions. The court's use of this term denies the existence of their family
relationship and foreshadows its conclusion several pages later; without understanding that
they had a family relationship, it was impossible for the court to recognize that they were co-
parents of Z.J.H.
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while Janice worked outside the home. On October 25, 1988, they
entered into a co-parenting agreement in which they agreed that they
would decide any custody issues involving their son by using mediation
and that the non-custodial parent would have "reasonable and liberal
visitation rights" to their child. During that month, Wendy and Janice
separated. Janice adopted Z.J.H. in November and, within a few
months, prevented Wendy from having contact with him.
Wendy brought an action in family court seeking visitation or custody
rights and enforcement of the co-parenting agreement. The trial court
granted summary judgment to Janice which was upheld by both the
court of appeals and the supreme court. The supreme court addressed
four issues: (a) whether Wendy had standing to obtain custody or phys-
ical placement of Z.J.H. under the doctrine of "in loco parentis", (b)
whether section 767.245(1), Stats., entitled Wendy to visitation, (c)
whether the co-parenting agreement between Wendy and Janice was
enforceable, and (d) whetherJanice was equitably estopped from deny-
ing that Wendy was an equitable parent and thus entitled to custody or
visitation of Z.J.H. The court found against Wendy and in favor of
Janice on all four issues.
(a) Standing to Obtain Custody Under in Loco Parentis
The court rejected Wendy's claim for standing by a series of succes-
sive steps that caught Wendy in a legal maze. First, it determined that a
"non-parent" could not bring an action to obtain custody of a minor
child unless the natural parents were unfit or unable to care for the
child or compelling reasons existed for awarding custody to a third per-
son. 196 Because Wendy conceded that Janice was neither unfit nor
unable to care for their son, the court turned to whether she had
alleged "compelling circumstances" that would justify providing cus-
tody to her.' 9 7 Denying Wendy's argument that the trial court's grant
of summary judgment prevented her from establishing facts showing
"compelling circumstances," the court rejected her claim. While
acknowledging that Wendy had a "parent-like" relationship with her
son, the court found that since no defect existed in Z.J.H.'s relationship
with Janice, Wendy had no standing to claim custody of the child.
196 In re Interest of Z.J.H. v. Hermes, 162 Wis. 2d 1002, 1009, 471 N.W.2d 202, 205
(1991). In proceeding through this discussion, the court "sets aside" the question of Wendy's
status as a parent and considers whether she has stated "compelling reasons" sufficient to
provide custody to her. Id. The simple fact that the court deems Wendy's parental status as
something that can be "set aside" foreshadows that result the court will reach.
197 Id. at 1010-1011, 471 N.W.2d at 205.
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Second, the court addressed whether Wendy was a parent entitled to
be considered for custody, like Z.J.H.'s adoptive parent, Janice, and
refused to grant her parental status. The court tried to distance itself
from its earlier decision in In re Custody of D.MM. 198 In that case, the
court had left the term "parent" undefined after finding that an aunt
did have standing to seek custody because the legislature could not
have intended to supplant the common law by restricting the definition
of parent so drastically.'99 In Z.J.H., the court said that the language in
D.M.M., which had indicated that the "ambiguous" term "parent" in
the visitation statute could include a person standing in loco parentis,
was merely dicta.2 °°
Third, having distinguished D.M.M., the Z.J.H. court stated that it
had never provided someone standing under "in loco parentis" to
bring a custody action because of the state's "parental preference"
standard.2' This standard provides "great deference" to the rights of
parents to raise their children and, while recognizing the rights of chil-
dren, assumes that it is in the best interest of the child to be raised by his
or her natural parent.202
The court does not skip a beat in rejecting Wendy's argument that
she is Z.J.H.'s parent and thus entitled to this "great deference" to raise
her child without state interference. The court's use of this standard to
prevent her from pursuing custody rights to her son requires circular
reasoning. Wendy cannot obtain custody as a nonlegal parent because
parents are given deference in raising their children; she cannot be a
parent because she has no legal relationship with ZJ.H. She has no
legal relationship with Z.J.H. because the court refused to interpret the
undefined term "parent" to include her; therefore, she was not entitled
to any "parental deference" to continue her relationship with her son.
The court also considered the legislative history of the custody and
visitation statutes. The court noted that section 767.24(3)(a) was
amended in 1987 to refer to "parent" rather than "party" in custody
disputes.208 Section 767.245(4) was also renumbered to section
198 In re Custody of D.M.M. v.J.M., 137 Wis. 2d 375, 404 N.W.2d 530 (1987) In that case,
a dispute arose between the child's aunt who had been appointed guardian and her mother
over custody. The court was interpreting Wis. Stats. § 767.245(4) (1985-1986) which stated
that visitation could be granted to parents, grandparents and great grandparents.
199 Z.JH., 162 Wis. 2d at 1014, 471 N.W.2d at 207.
200 Id. The court also noted that it held that the statute could be alternatively defined to
include natural parents only. Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1016, 471 N.W.2d at 208. Section 767.24(3)(a) had been section 767.24(l)(c)
(1985).
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767.245(1) and amended to include " 'a person who has maintained a
relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the child' as per-
sons who may petition for visitation rights.""2 4 In considering the dif-
ferent language in these statutes, the court stated that the legislature
did not intend to preclude these persons from obtaining visitation
rights, but must have intended to preclude them from obtaining cus-
tody rights or it would have amended the custody statute similarly.20 5
This interpretation of the statute is logical, but it ignores the fact that
when the legislature amended section (3)(a) to include the term "par-
ent" instead of "party', ° it also could have amended the rest of the
statute to refer to "parent" instead of "party." But it chose not to do
so. Thus, under section 767.24(2)(b), after finding that joint custody
would be in a child's best interest, the court may give joint custody to
both "parties." It seems, therefore, just as likely that the legislature
was willing to leave open the possibility that one of the "parties"
obtaining joint custody would not be a "parent." Otherwise, it would
have changed the language in the entire statute to refer only to parents.
The majority seems to be using legislative history analysis to support
the conclusion it wishes to reach while not considering how the legisla-
tive history supports the other result as well.
Before deciding whether to provide Wendy with visitation (having
just determined that the legislature did not "intend to preclude such
persons from visitation rights" 20 7), the majority explained its policy rea-
son for denying custody rights to people standing in loco parentis. The
court was concerned that providing standing to people like Wendy
would
open the doors to multiple parties claiming custody of children
by virtue of their in loco parentis status. Without limitations as we
have discussed today, a child could have MULTIPLE "PARENTS" and
could find himself or herself subject to multiple custody and visi-
tation arrangements. . . . It would be virtually impossible to
ensure equity to all parties and protect the best interests of the
child under such a scenario.208
This reasoning ignores the reality that children like Z.J.H. do, in fact,
have "multiple parents." Refusing to recognize this does not alter this
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Wis. Stats. § 767.24(3)(a) concerns transferring custody of a child to a relative, county
department, or child welfare agency when the court finds that neither parent is fit and proper
to have care and custody of the child. The amended language substituted "parent" for
-party" in this section referring to the termination of parental rights.
207 Z.J.H., 162 Wis. at 1016, 471 N.W.2d at 208.
208 Id. at 1017-1018, 471 N.W.2d at 208-209.
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reality. Janice adopted ZJ.H. into a family consisting of herself,
Wendy, and their child. Like numerous other children, Z.J.H. was
brought into a nuclear family with two parents. This family atmosphere
was no different than that of the "normal" nuclear family. 209 A legal
parent will not have countless family relationships throughout his or
her child's life, and thus only a few individuals, at most, will be able to




For the court to envision hundreds of "parents" clamoring for the
courtyard steps seeking custody of Z.J.H. is pure fantasy. If the court
were to adopt one of the standards suggested by Polikoff or Bartlett or
any of the equitable theories, it could establish clear limitations on
those adults who potentially could claim custody rights. That standard
would protect both the legal parents and those standing in loco paren-
tis. Legal parents would know that by fostering a "parent-like" rela-
tionship between an adult and their child that they would risk having to
share custody or visitation with that adult. They could choose to foster
such a relationship or not based on their legal status as the child's
parent.
Additionally, the nonlegal parent would be able to clarify with the
legal parent what his or her status would be in the future and establish
some guidelines for entering into a relationship with the legal parent's
child. This same result also occurs by way of the court's decision. Non-
legal parents in alternative families have been told that they will not be
recognized as important adults in their partner's children's lives. This
result violates the "best interests of the child" standard because it pre-
vents all children living in alternative families from maintaining a long-
standing relationship with their nonlegal parent. The court has told
these nonlegal parents not to enter into any kind of loving, parenting
relationship with these children because they will receive no protection
of that relationship. This kind of legally mandated lack of relationship
surely cannot be in these children's best interests. And while many
would condemn the nonlegal parent who acts in such a loveless way
toward his or her partner's children, blame surely cannot be laid at
their feet. The court in its decision established this scenario and
remains responsible for the harm that results from it.
209 There is no difference unless one is concerned that the adults are in a same-sex
relationship. But for a child the age of ZJ.H. there is no difference for him except that he was
receiving the love of two parents, rather than simply the love of the one legal parent he had.
210 The court also seems to be ignoring the reality of numerous marriages and divorces
that exist in this country today. Thus, children from traditional nuclear families will also
frequently have "multiple" parents.
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The court remained fixated on its concern of countless individuals
attempting to bring claims for parental status while brushing aside the
impact that its decision will have on the numerous children living in
alternative families.
The California Court of Appeals appropriately stated: "We do
not, however, agree that the only way to avoid such an unfortunate
situation [the suffering a child such as ZJ.H. may endure as a
result of his separation from Wendy] is for the courts to adopt
appellant's novel theory by which a nonparent can acquire the
rights of a parent, and then face years of unraveling the complex
practical, social and constitutional ramifications of this expan-
sion of the definition of parent." While our decision today may
result in occasional unfortunate consequences for minor children who
have developed relationships with individuals claiming standing
under the doctrine of in loco parentis, the legislature deliberately
spared the legal system from an obligation to discern a just result
from among the myriad of circumstances in which individuals
could claim rights under the in loco parentis doctrine.
2 1
'
It would be difficult to find a paragraph in a court opinion that is
more heartless or misfocused than this one. First, the court, in its
strongest recognition of the children affected by its decision, merely
referred to the "unfortunate" situation and consequences that will
result. To label the loss of a parent for a minor child as an "unfortu-
nate" situation shows an appalling lack of conscience from the highest
court of Wisconsin. Second, the court added insult to injury by, in the
same breath, noting that the "legal system" has been spared the obliga-
tion of achieving a "just" result in these cases. One finds it hard to feel
much sympathy for a legal system which ignores the reality of the chil-
dren and nonlegal parents looking to it for help in solving their
extremely emotional problems and instead sighs a breath of relief
because it has been able to avoid the inconvenient hassle of solving this
problem.
(b) Statutory Visitation Rights
Having denied Wendy standing to raise her custody claim, the court
then refused to provide visitation rights to her. It reached this result
even though, just a few pages earlier, it expressly recognized the legis-
lature's intent to expand the people eligible to seek visitation by
amending the controlling statute, Wis. Stat. sec. 767.245(1), to include
a "person who has maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child
211 Id. at 1018 (quoting Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 841, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219).
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relationship with the child.- 21 2 This result is particularly anomalous
because the legislature made the following finding when enacting 1987
Wis. Act 355:
In its study, the special committee on custody arrangements
concluded that the current laws and practices relating to child
custody determinations in divorce and other actions affecting the
family:
5. Fail to recognize the importance to the child of continuing
contact with stepparents and persons with whom the child has
lived in a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship. 2
13
Given the clear legislative intent to broaden the definition of those
eligible to petition for visitation, the court had to turn to prior case law
to reject Wendy's claim. Although the legislature gave it the clear
opportunity to do justice between the legal parent, the nonlegal parent,
and the child in these cases, the court refused to do so.
The court held that, while a third party was not precluded2 14 from
bringing an action to establish visitation rights, "a review of our case law
leads to the inescapable conclusion that there must be an underlying
action affecting the family unit before the provisions of sec. 767.245(1)
are implicated.- 21 5 Only in cases affecting the family unit, such as
divorce, custody, or CHIPS2" 6 actions, can a visitation action be
brought "against parental wishes. 217
The court turned to the court of appeals decision in Van Cleve v. Hem-
minger,2 8 to reject the claim that a visitation action could be brought
beyond these limited contexts. In Van Cleve, the court of appeals stated
that the legislature did not intend for the state to intervene in the par-
ents' decision regarding their children's best interests "when the family
unit is intact.",2 9 Thus, the court concluded:
212 Id. at 1016, 471 N.W.2d at 208.
2I3 Act of April 22, 1988, 1987 Wis. Laws 1259, 1260.
214 This is the court's language. Z.J.H. 162 Wis. 2d at 1020, 471 N.W.2d at 209. Two
pages earlier, the court had based its rejection of Wendy's claim to custody of Z.J.H. on the
fact that the legislature had only amended the visitation statute to recognize parent-like
relationships, not the custody statute. Once it begins to consider whether it should follow the
clear language of that statute to provide visitation rights to Wendy, it conveniently finds no
such clear intent. It merely indicates that the legislature did not preclude such actions by third
parties, even though the legislature specifically amended the statute to recognize them.
215 Id. at 1020, 471 N.W.2d at 209.
216 Child in need of protection and services.
217 162 Wis. 2d at 1020, 471 N.W.2d at 209-2 10.
218 141 Wis. 2d. 543, 415 N.W.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1987).
219 162 Wis. 2d at 1022, 471 N.W.2d at 210. The court noted that if the legislature had
disagreed with this interpretation of the visitation statute by the Van Cleve court, it would have
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The rationale behind these cases was that the legislature did not
intend to override a parent's determination of visitation unless
an underlying action affecting the family unit had been filed,
because in such an instance, ordering visitation with non-parents may
help to mitigate the trauma of a dissolving relationship. The presence of
an intact family unit merely signals the absence of a dissolving fam-
ily relationship.
220
By finding that Janice and Z.J.H. were an intact family unit and there
was no underlying action affecting that family unit in this case, it had
no authority" to allow Wendy to petition for visitation rights.22 1
While the legislature did include stepparents and parent-like individu-
als in the group of people who could qualify for visitation rights, the
court found no intent to grant them visitation rights in an intact family.
This interpretation is unfair to people in Wendy's situation. No state
in the country allows gay men or lesbians to marry, so Wendy cannot
bring a divorce action based on that marriage.2 2 2 Wendy has been
denied, in this case, the right to bring a custody action for Z.J.H.
Wendy has conceded her ex-partner's fitness to care for their son and
thus cannot bring a CHIPS action. Using case law (which it has the
power to alter) and a narrow definition of what constitutes "an intact
family unit," the court precluded Wendy and others in her situation
from maintaining a relationship with their children when their families
dissolve.
The court did not recognize, in any way, that Janice, Wendy, and
Z.J.H. had a family relationship that had dissolved. The court simply
considered the legal relationships, found that the child and his legal
parent were still living as a family, and excised Wendy from the family.
No acknowledgement was made that a dissolving family relationship
was involved in this case, because it was not a family that the courts
recognize. Due to its alternative nature and its exclusion from legal
recognition, the court refused to help "mitigate the trauma" of the dis-
solving relationship for both the nonlegal parent and the child. It put
on blinders, took a myopic view of the family, saw that it remained
intact, and moved on.
amended the visitation statute when it made the changes in the 1987 Act. Id. at 1023, 471
N.W.2d at 211. For a response to this assertion, see infra notes 226 to 229 and accompanying
text.
220 Id. at 1022, 471 N.W.2d at 210 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
221 Id.
222 Colker, supra note 17, at 321.
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Justice Bablitch focused his dissent on this myopia.
Everyone agrees that children of a dissolving traditional relationship
deserve and need the protection of the courts. Yet the majority holds
that children of a dissolving non-traditional relationship are not
entitled to the same protection. What logic compels that result?
The legislature could not have intended such an absurd and
cruel result, but that is what the majority of this court has
determined.
Media accounts, and the majority opinion, focus solely on the
rights of the adults in this non-traditional relationship that is dis-
solving. Lost in the media accounts, and in the majority opinion,
are the interests of at least equal if not paramount concern: the
interests of the child.
What about the child, ZJ.H.? Who speaks for him? What is in
his interest? The majority denies him any legal significance. He
is a nonentity in this battle between two parents. Because this is
a non-traditional parent relationship, the result of the majority's
opinion is that the child's interests will not even be considered.
It is as if he does not even exist.
But the child does exist. And thousands of others like him do
exist. These children need, and deserve, the protection of the
court as much as children of a dissolving traditional relationship.
Their interests at least ought to be considered.22 3
Bablitch continued by attacking the majority's legal premise. He
agreed with its reliance on Van Cleve, which he called a well-reasoned
opinion and involved children of a traditional relationship. 224 But he
noted that its underlying rationale was "that children of a dissolving
relationship need and deserve the protection of the court lest they
become mere pawns in the conflict between the parents. 2 25 While rec-
ognizing the majority's concern with this when it relates to traditional
family relationships, he wondered about the lack of an equal concern
for the children of dissolving non-traditional relationships. 226 He con-
cluded that the legislature could not have intended such a result, given
its 1987 amendments to the visitation statutes. 2 7 He interpreted those
amendments to show a legislative intent that the Wisconsin courts con-
sider whether visitation is in the best interests of the child when the
adult has been involved in a relationship with the parent, that relation-
ship has dissolved, and the adult established a parent-child like rela-
223 162 Wis. 2d at 1032, 471 N.W.2d at 214-215.
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tionship with the child.22' He concluded that the majority has rewritten
the visitation statute to include an exception where none existed. 9
Bablitch noted that the facts in this case perhaps were not sufficiently
sympathetic to achieve the majority's concern. He noted that the child
was in Wendy and Janice's home for seven months. Janice did not
adopt the child until after they had separated. The agreement was
entered into after they had separated. 2" Bablitch wondered if different
facts would have achieved a different result.23 ' He refused to view this
case as a basis for what the court will hold in future cases involving
children of non-traditional relationships. 2
Thus even Bablitch also shows some lack of understanding for the
problem that Z.J.H. and Wendy face. While ZJ.H. and Wendy did not
have a great deal of time to establish their relationship, no member of
the court denies that they had established a parent-child "like" rela-
tionship. While Wendy may not have spent years with her son, those
months were obviously extremely important to her as can be seen by
her willingness to pursue her case to the state's highest court. Wendy
became a parent when ZJ.H. entered her family. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court took that away from her.
(c) Parenting Contract Unenforceable
The next issue the court discussed was whether the parties' co-
parenting agreement was enforceable. The court held that rights to
custody and visitation are controlled by statutory and case law and can-
not be contracted away.233 Therefore, the contract must be void to the
extent it attempted to provide custody and visitation rights to
Wendy.2 4 The court also focused on the "societal and constitutional
interests in maintaining the relationship between a natural or adoptive
parent and that parent's child" as a basis for voiding contractual provi-
sions that would affect that relationship. 23 5
But the court focused on the public interest in protecting both the
rights of the natural or adoptive parent and "of the family unit as
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involved in this case consisted of Z.J.H. and his two mothers, Janice and
Wendy. If a public interest exists in protecting the family unit, then
Wendy should have had a policy claim for having her contractual agree-
ment upheld.
Justice Abrahamson, dissenting from the majority's decision, focused
on the enforceability of the contract between Wendy and Janice. " ' She
argued that the majority's "all-encompassing, broad language" that
contracts affecting visitation and the parent-child relationship were
against public policy "cannot be correct.- 238 While recognizing that
state statutes do govern visitation and support of children "under certain
circumstances," they do not bar parents from entering into agreements
on physical placement, care, and financial support of a child when
intended to protect the best interests of that child.23 9
Abrahamson focused on Wisconsin's history of protecting the free-
dom of contract and the test that should have been used to determine
whether a contract is unenforceable for violating public policy.240 In a
showing of distaste for the majority's decision, she pointed out that this
test "prevents courts from refusing to enforce agreements on the basis
of a court's amorphous notions of public good."-241 The majority's
result was incorrect because it did not balance the policies favoring
enforcement against those disfavoring enforcement. 242
Abrahamson noted that "the best interest of the child" is the domi-
nant public policy in family matters and circumstances relating to the
policy that may exist, under the facts of this case, that would warrant
granting visitation rights under the agreement. 24' Due to the case's
summary judgment status, Abrahamson concluded that it should have
been remanded for a hearing. 244 She would have had the district court
specifically consider "such public policies as protection of freedom of
contract, protection against impairment of family relations, and the
237 Id. at 1028-1029, 471 N.W.2d at 213.
238 Id.
239 Id. (emphasis added).
240 Id. She noted that the court must (1) define precisely the relevant public policy and its
source, (2) determine whether there is a conflict between that policy and the contract, and (3)
determine what remedy would best further the public interest.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1029, 471 N.W.2d at 213.
243 Id. at 1029, 471 N.W.2d at 213-214. She pointed to section 191 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts which states that agreements affecting a minor's custody are
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best interests of the child in determining whether any part of the agree-
ment affecting the child should be enforced.-
245
(d) Equitable Remedies
The final issue addressed by the majority was its refusal to equitably
estop Janice from denying that Wendy was Z.J.H.'s equitable parent.
The court brushed aside this argument by stating that statutory limita-
tions cannot be avoided by estoppel.246 What the court's discussion
ignored is that equitable remedies are always invoked when legal reme-
dies are unsatisfactory.247 Thus, to answer a request for an equitable
remedy with a claim that legal remedies control the situation is to beg
the question presented.248
The court attempted to distinguish this case from In re Paternity of
D.L.H. ,249 but was not convincing. In D.L.H., the husband of a woman
sued to establish a right to continue his relationship with his stepchild.
The court of appeals concluded that the husband could use the status
of "equitable parent" to equitably estop his wife from instituting a
paternity suit against him.25 ° In this case, the majority attempted to
draw a distinction between the two cases by noting that, in D.L.H., the
husband was using equitable estoppel as a shield to protect his right to
a relationship with the child while Wendy was using equitable estoppel
to achieve custody against an adoptive parent. 25 ' This distinction is
simply untenable. Wendy was using estoppel defensively to protect her
right to a relationship with ZJ.H., just as the husband did in D.L.H. In
both cases, the nonlegal parent attempted to estop the legal parent
from denying that a parental relationship existed between the nonlegal
parent and the child.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered every issue raised by
Wendy and rejected each of them. Its legal maneuvers and myopic
view of the family indicate a refusal to recognize the difficult societal
problem facing it. Refusing to recognize alternative families is one way
245 Id.
246 Id. at 1025, 471 N.W.2d at 212.
247 Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1065, 1071-1072
(1979).
248 Plaintiffs are entitled to the most complete, practical, and efficient remedy and equitable
remedies become available when there is no adequate remedy at law. Id.
249 142 Wis. 2d 606, 419 N.W.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1987).
250 D.L.H., 142 Wis. 2d at 617, 419 N.W.2d at 287. In that case, the wife brought the
paternity action to establish that her husband was not the child's biological father and, thus,
was not entitled to continue his parental relationship after the parties obtained a divorce.
251 Z.J.H., 162 Wis. 2d at 1029, 471 N.W.2d at 213-214.
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to resolve that problem; but that refusal does nothing to resolve the
problem that will continue to exist for the countless nonlegal parents
and children of alternative families who expected more from the state's
highest court.
3. Nancy S. v. Michele G.
The California Court of Appeals for the First District reached the
same result as the courts from New York and Wisconsin. In the first
reported decision on this topic, the California court rejected all the
possible equitable theories available to it in rejecting the nonlegal par-
ent's claim for custody or visitation of her two children.
Michele and Nancy, a lesbian couple, lived together for sixteen years
and had two children together. The women began living together in
1969 and, in November of that year, had a private marriage ceremony.
Later they decided to have children by artificially inseminating Nancy.
Nancy is the biological mother of both children, a daughter born in
1980 and a son born in 1984. Both children have Michele's last name
as their middle name, and Michele was listed on both children's birth
certificate in the place reserved for the father's name. Both children
called both of their mothers "mom." In 1985, the women separated.
Their daughter, who was five at that time, continued to live with
Michele and their son, who was one, lived with Nancy. A custody
arrangement allowed the two children to be together four days a week.
This arrangement continued for three years. Then Nancy wanted to
change the custody arrangement so that each of them had custody of
both children fifty percent of the time. Michele opposed this change
and attempts to mediate the dispute failed.
Nancy brought an action under the Uniform Parentage Act seeking a
declaration that she was entitled to sole legal and physical custody, that
Michele was not the parent of either child, and that Michele could
obtain visitation only as permitted by Nancy. The trial court granted
temporary custody to Nancy. In answering the complaint, Michele
admitted that she was not the biological mother of either child but
denied Nancy's allegations that she was not their parent. She also
requested custody and visitation in accordance with their original
agreement. The trial court rejected Michele's arguments that she was a
parent under the Uniform Parentage Act or that she had the stattds of
de facto parent which entitled her to custody or visitation. The trial
court granted sole physical and legal custody to Nancy. It determined
that even if Michele could prove that she was a de facto parent to the
children, it could not award custody to her over Nancy's objections
[Vol. VIII:5
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because Nancy was the natural mother and qualified as a parent under
the act. Therefore, it awarded sole physical and legal custody to Nancy.
The California Court of Appeals began its analysis by interpreting
the Uniform Parentage Act. That Act defines parent as one who is the
natural or adoptive parent of a child.25 The court noted that Michele
did not dispute that she was not the natural mother of either child nor
that she had not adopted either child. The court also concluded that
the children were not born into a legally recognized marriage which
would, arguably, have permitted Michele to be recognized as a parent
under the Act.25s Although Michele was not a parent as defined by the
Act, she argued that her long-term relationship with the children enti-
tled her to seek custody and visitation with them as though the dispute
had arisen between two legally recognized parents. The court acknowl-
edged that, although she had not proven her allegations regarding her
relationship with the children, the record would support her allegations
that, since their birth, she had "performed the role of a loving
mother." 254
The court of appeals considered most of the available equitable theo-
ries that would have entitled Michele to parental status. In language
remarkably similar to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's, the court
rejected Michele's arguments that she stood in loco parentis to her chil-
dren255 or that Nancy should be equitably estopped from asserting that
252 Cal. Civ. Code § 7001.
253 This analysis by the court raises the numerous issues, discussed at note 301, infra, on
whether gay men and lesbians should be allowed to marry. The court notes that the Act
creates a presumption that a man is the natural father if (1) he meets the conditions imposed
under section 621 of the Evidence Code (discussed supra notes 104-105, concerning Michael
H.), (2) the child is born during a valid marriage or one that apparently complies with the law,
(3) after the child is born, he and the child's mother marry or attempt to marry and he
engages in conduct by which he holds the child out as his own, such as putting his name on
the birth certificate, or (4) he is the husband of woman who bears a child through artificial
insemination. Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 836 n.3, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215 n. 13. If Nancy and
Michele's "private" marriage ceremony in November 1969 was recognized by the legal
system, there is no question that Michele would have to be recognized as her children's parent
under the Uniform Parentage Act. Although it is sex-specific in referring to a man and
husband, if their marriage were valid, Michele would meet each of the four scenarios under
the Act which would presume her parenthood.
254 Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 836 n.4, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216 n.4. It is interesting to note
that the court, while acknowledging Michele's role in the children's lives, cannot bring itself to
call her their mother. Instead, it simply notes that she performed that "role."
255 The court acknowledged that the doctrine of in loco parentis had been used in the
context of torts cases to impose the same rights and obligations on those standing in loco
parentis as those imposed on parents by statutory and common law. Id. at 838, 279 Cal. Rptr.
at 217. The court noted that it has also been used to confer benefits on the child, such as
favorable inheritance tax treatment or workers' compensation benefits. But it found that the
doctrine had never been applied in a custody dispute to give a "nonparent" the same rights as
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Michele was not the parent of their children.256 The court then consid-
ered three other possible avenues for Michele to achieve parental sta-
a parent and refused to extend it to do so in this case. Id. It referred to Perry v. Superior
Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 480, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (Ct. App. 1980) where the court of appeal
considered a trial court decision using in loco parentis to award a stepparent visitation of his
wife's daughter by a previous marriage. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial
court could not award visitation to the husband unless the child was a child of the marriage.
Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. at 838, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (citing Perry, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 484, 166
Cal. Rptr. at 586). The court of appeal invited the Legislature to resolve the problem as
applied to stepparents and the Legislature did so by passing section 4351.5 of the California
Civil Code in 1982. In Nancy S., the court made the same invitation to the Legislature. As
Part III, infra, explains, however, it is unlikely that the legislature will respond as quickly to
this court's invitation as it did to the Perry court's.
256 The court of appeal admitted that equitable estoppel has been used in California to
impose support obligations on a husband who represented to his wife's children that he was
their natural father and attempted to deny paternity to avoid support obligations. Nancy S.,
228 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217. But it noted that it has never been used in
California against a natural parent to award custody and visitation to a "nonparent." Id. at
839, 279 Cal Rptr. at 218 (citing In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d 837, 842, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 38, 42 (1975)). However, the court did note that in Valle, 53 Cal. App. 3d at 842, 126
Cal. Rptr. at 42 (1975), the court acknowledged that "we perceive no good reason why the
trial court should not have jurisdiction to award child custody when the parenthood is
established by estoppel and when the issue is fairly and properly litigated with both parties
present." The Nancy S. court distinguished that case by noting that neither party involved in
that case was the natural parent of the children. But that factual distinction does not negate
the logical implication that the Valle court expounded: to the extent that equitable estoppel
can be used to impose support obligations, no principled reason exists for preventing its use
to provide custody or visitation rights. See also, Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601,
607, 408 N.W.2d 516, 520 (1987).
The Nancy S. court completed its discussion of equitable estoppel by distinguishing this case
from that logical implication. It noted that "even if the doctrine of equitable estoppel could
be used against a wife and in favor of a husband to award custody as if the dispute were between
two natural parents, we note that the use of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, in these out-of-
state cases, is rooted in " '[one] of the strongest presumptions in law [i.e.] that a child born to
a married woman is the legitimate child of her husband.'" 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal.
Rptr. at 218 (emphasis added)(citation omitted).
The court then noted that no similar presumption existed in this case, but did not explain
why the existence of such a presumption was necessary for using the doctrine in cases such as
Nancy S. The stepfather is no more a natural parent than any other nonlegal parent: he
simply has a claim based on his marriage to the child's mother. Since gay men and lesbians
cannot marry, they cannot make a similar claim. But they have a synonymous relationship
with the child's parent and, if that relationship is sufficient to provide the stepfather with
equitable rights, no justifiable distinction can be made for unmarried partners.
The California Court of Appeal would have been well-advised to have considered more
carefully the decision of Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App.2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Ct.
App. 1961), which it cites to support its refusal to find that Nancy was equitably estopped
from claiming that Michele was not the children's mother. In Clevenger, the I st District Court
of Appeal noted:
The relationship of father and child is too sacred to be thrown off like an old
cloak, used and unwanted. We are dealing with the care and education of a child
during his minority and with the obligation of a party who has assumed as a
father to discharge it. The law is not so insensitive as to countenance the breach of an
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tus-de facto parenthood, equitable parenthood, and functional
parenthood-and rejected all three.
A de facto parent is one who " 'on a day-to-day basis, assumes the
role of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physical needs and his
psychological need for affection and care.' "257 The court acknowl-
edged that the facts established Michele was her children's de facto par-
ent but refused to provide her with rights to seek custody and visitation
based on that status.258 The court rejected her claim that, once having
established her status as de facto parent, the court should consider the
dispute as it would if two "parents" were involved. 59 Instead, it con-
cluded that custody can be awarded to a de facto parent only upon evi-
dence that parental custody is detrimental to the children. 26° The court
based its decision on a presumption in favor of parental custody.261 It
is imposed when custody disputes occur between a parent and a stran-
ger. 262 By refusing to provide any import to Michele's status as a de
facto parent, the court was able to use this presumption to deny her
custody of her children.2 63
The court then turned to equitable parenthood, which it was careful
to distinguish from equitable estoppel.2' The court referred to the
Michigan case of Atkinson v. Atkinson 265 to explain that equitable
parenthood would allow a person "to obtain the status of a parent in a
custody dispute with [a natural parent] and to have the dispute settled
as if it were between two natural parents, according to the child's best inter-
obligation in so vital and deep a relation, undertaken, partially fulfilled, and suddenly
sundered.
189 Cal. App. 2d at 674, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 716(emphasis added). There, the court recognized
that parenthood is too "sacred" to be easily discarded, even if that parenthood is not based on
biological connection. In this case, the court should have recognized that Michele's parental
relationship with her children deserved equal concern and sanctity.
257 Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (quoting In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d




261 Id. at 837 n.5, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216 n.5. The court cited In re Marriage of Halpern, 133
Cal. App. 3d 297, 311-313, 184 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748 (1982) as its source for the parental
presumption. This presumption does conflict, however, with established California law which
indicates that all disputes over custody and visitation should be resolved based on the best
interests of the child. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (West 1982).
262 In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d at 693-694, 523 P.2d at 254, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
263 Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 836-37, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17. Even though a de facto
parent is necessarily not an "outsider," the courts and the legislature have placed paramount
importance upon the relationship between the natural or adoptive parent and the child.
264 Id.
265 Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987).
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ests.266 The court acknowledged that California had adopted the under-
lying doctrine of "equitable adoption" for inheritance purposes.26
7
Nonetheless, it refused to adopt the concept of equitable parenthood
for custody determinations, reasoning that because of "complex practi-
cal, social and constitutional ramifications. . . expanding the class of
persons entitled to assert parental rights . . . was better left to the
Legislature."
2 68
This abdication of the court's responsibilities to the legislature was
reiterated when the court considered whether to adopt a functional def-
inition of parenthood. Under Polikoff's theory, functional parenthood
would allow a class of persons to seek custody and visitation according
to the same standards as a natural parent when that person has main-
tained a functional parental relationship with a child and when the rela-
tionship was created by a legally recognized parent who intended the
relationship to be parental in nature.2 69  The Court refused to adopt




As this discussion has shown, the New York, Wisconsin, and Califor-
nia courts all refused to interpret undefined terms in statutes or to
apply the equitable doctrines available to them when faced with cases
brought by nonlegal parents in alternative families. All three courts
abdicated their responsibility to use the existing options for resolving
this difficult societal problem facing the legal system. After rejecting
the numerous alternatives available to them, they indicated that they
were not responsible for the result that occurred in these cases.
Instead, each pointed to the state legislature as the place where the
expansion of the law to recognize nonlegal parents in alternative fami-
lies should occur.
In Nancy S., the California court presented the problem of the courts
fashioning remedies in these situations.
We agree with appellant that the absence of any legal formali-
zation of her relationship to the children has resulted in a tragic
situation. As is always the case, it is the children who will suffer
266 Nancy S., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (citing In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 203 Cal. App.
3d 514, 519-520, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (1988)).
269 Id. (citing Polikoff, supra note 7, at 464.)
270 Id.
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the most as a result of the inability of the adults, who they love
and need, to reach an agreement. We do not, however, agree
that the only way to avoid such an unfortunate situation is for the
courts to adopt appellant's novel theory by which a nonparent
can acquire the rights of a parent, and then face years of unrav-
eling the complex practical, social, and constitutional ramifica-
tions of this expansion of the definition of a parent. . . . By
deferring to the Legislature in matters involving complex social and policy
ramifications far beyond the facts of the particular case, we are not telling
the parties that the issues they raise are unworthy of legal recognition. To
the contrary, we intend only to illustrate the limitations of the courts in
fashioning a comprehensive solution to such a complex and socially signifi-
cant issue.
271
The Wisconsin Supreme Court included much of this quote directly in
its opinion.2 It went on to note that "the legislature deliberately
spared the legal system from an obligation to discern a just result from
among the myriad of circumstances in which individuals could claim
rights under the in loco parentis doctrine. "273 The New York Court of
Appeals echoed this concern when it stated that it declined the invita-
tion to define the term "parent" in the New York custody statute to
include "categories of nonparents who have developed a relationship
with a child or who have had prior relationships with a child's parents
and who wish to continue visitation with the child. '2 74 Citing the Cali-
fornia decision, the court said that, while in individual cases it may be
beneficial for a child to have a continuing relationship with a
"nonparent," the legislature had not given that individual the opportu-
nity to require a fit parent to allow such contact.27 5
These courts are correct in their assertion that having the legislature
take the lead in resolving custody, visitation, and support issues for
nonlegal parents in alternative families would be preferable to a case-
by-case analysis.2 76 But it is highly unlikely and extremely speculative
if, and when, each state legislature would act to resolve this problem.
Thus, pointing to them to solve the problem simply indicates a willing-
ness on the part of the courts to abdicate their judicial responsibility.
When the state legislatures have enacted statutes recognizing the
bonds between nonlegal parents and children in alternative families,
they have provided the courts with the means to solve numerous
271 Id. (emphasis added).
272 Z.J.H., 162 Wis. 2d at 1018, 471 N.W.2d at 209.
273 Id.
274 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 657, 572 N.E.2d at 29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
275 Id.
276 Family Resemblance, supra note 2, at 1657.
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problems. For example, section 109.119 of the Oregon Revised Stat-
utes277 allows individuals who have "established emotional ties creating
a child-parent relationship" with a child to petition the court for cus-
tody or visitation.278 The Oregon Supreme Court has not applied this
statute to a case such as Nancy S., Alison D., or In the Matter of Z.J.H., but
the legislature has given the court a statutory basis for recognizing and
protecting the relationship between the nonlegal parent and the
child(ren) of alternative families in dissolution cases. 279 While some
have criticized the Oregon statute for being both overinclusive and
277 Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 109.119 (Butterworth 1990).
278 The statute defines a child-parent relationship as:
a relationship that exists or did exist, in whole or in part, within the six months
preceding the filing of an action under this section, and in which relationship a
person having physical custody of a child or residing in the same household as
the child supplied, or otherwise made available to the child, food, clothing,
shelter and incidental necessaries and provided the child with necessary care,
education and discipline, and which relationship continued on a day-to-day
basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled
the child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the child's physical needs.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4). Polikoff notes that the Oregon Supreme Court has not defini-
tively ruled whether the statute merely grants standing or has altered state substantive law.
Polikoff, supra note 7, at 487. An amendment to a related section seems to imply that the
change is substantive:
If the court determines that custody, guardianship, right of visitation, or other
generally recognized right of a parent or person in loco parentis, is appropriate
in the case, the court shall grant such custody, guardianship, right of visitation
or other right to the person having the child-parent relationship, if to do so is in
the best interest of the child.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(1). Finally, another section of 109.119 allows an individual to file a
visitation petition if he or she "has maintained an ongoing personal relationship with substan-
tial continuity for at least one year, through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutu-
ality" when the court decides "from clear and convincing evidence that visitation is in the best
interests of the child and is otherwise appropriate in the case." Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(5).
The combination of these statutes seems to indicate an across-the-board effort by the Ore-
gon legislature to address the problems of nonlegal parents of alternative families.
279 The Oregon Supreme Court has noted that the statute's language
is at least in some respects wholly consistent with this court's previous decisions
in child custody disputes between natural parents and others. In such disputes,
it would never be proper to give custody to someone other than a natural parent
unless custody in the other person best served the child's interests.
In re Marriage of Hruby & Hruby, 304 Or. 500, 516 n.9, 748 P.2d 57, 66 n.9 (1987)(emphasis
in original). Given this footnote, it may be possible that the Oregon Supreme Court would
follow the dictates of the California, New York, and Wisconsin courts by falling back on its
prior custody cases, deny visitation to nonlegal parents of alternative families despite the
opportunity the Oregon Legislature has provided to avoid such a result. It would be interest-
ing to see what analytical course the Oregon court would have to take to reject an extension to
alternative families given the explicit language of the Legislature.
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underinclusive,2 8 0 the legislature has done what no other state legisla-
ture has done 28 1 : recognized the need for the type of across-the-board
280 Polikoff points out the problems with the statute. She notes that the statute is
overinclusive in not adequately protecting parental rights because it "does not require any
showing of the biological parent's intent to create a parental relationship in the other
person." Polikoff, supra note 7, at 488. Thus, it would be possible under the statute for a
babysitter, boyfriend, girlfriend, or relative living in the parent's home to qualify. Id.
Additionally, she notes the statute's underinclusiveness due to its six-month residency
requirement. Thus, it may exclude individuals functioning as parents with the legal parent's
consent but who, "because of financial hardship, emotional turmoil, a temporarily satisfactory
custody and visitation arrangement, or some other reason" do not petition for visitation
within six months of leaving the household. Id. at 488-489. While she believes that the
residency requirement, which was added in the 1987 amendment of the statute, is an
improvement because it eliminates "nonresident caretakers, neighbors, or nearby extended
family members" from obtaining custody, it is not 'a close enough fit for establishing
parenthood. Id. at 489. Instead she would encourage lawmakers to adopt her formulation for
determining parenthood.
Courts or legislatures looking for guidance in developing a new definition of
parenthood would best serve the interests of children by focusing on two
criteria: the legally unrelated adult's performance of parenting functions and
the child's view of that adult as a parent. Courts would also protect the interests
of legal parents in parental autonomy by focusing on the actions and intent of
those parents in creating additional parental relationships.
Id. at 490-491.
281 The Minnesota Legislature has made a move in the direction taken by the Oregon
Legislature but the language of its statutes is not as comprehensive as the Oregon legislative
scheme. In Minn. Stat. § 257.022(2)(b)(West 1982), the Legislature provided for visitation
rights when a minor has resided with an "other" person. The statute states:
If an unmarried minor has resided in a household with a person, other than a
foster parent, for two years or more and no longer resides with the person, the
person may petition the district court for an order granting the person
reasonable visitation rights to the child during the child's minority. The court
shall grant the petition if it finds that:
(1) visitation rights would be in the best interests of the child;
(2) the petitioner and child had established emotional ties creating a parent
and child relationship; and
(3) visitation rights would not interfere with the relationship between the
custodial parent and the child.
The scheme does seem to recognize that a "parent and child relationship" is possible between
a child and another person. However, it is not as extensive a recognition as that provided by
the Oregon Legislature which allows a court to recognize a child-parent relationship when
granting custody, guardianship, visitation or other parental rights. On the contrary, the Min-
nesota statute only grants visitation rights to these nonbiological parents.
Additionally, the Minnesota court of appeal's decision interpreting the statute may cause
some difficulty to members of alternative families attempting to use it to obtain visitation
rights to the children of their families. In In re the Matter of Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d
175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), the court held that the petitioner seeking visitation rights must
show prima facie evidence of all three factors before receiving an evidentiary hearing on the
petition. Id. at 181. That case involved a dispute between two women who had lived together
as lesbians over the child one of them bore with her prior husband with whom she later
became reinvolved. The court noted that the court would need to find the existence of all
three factors before granting the petition and therefore, to require prima facie evidence of
each factor before holding an evidentiary hearing on the petition, would promote principles
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statutory guidance that the California, New York and Wisconsin courts
requested.
The problem with expecting state legislatures to take the lead in
resolving this problem, however, is that nonlegal parents in alternative
families do not present a strong enough political presence to obtain
this legislative assistance, at least in the immediate future. Obtaining
legislative assistance in changing the law is very difficult indeed. With
the number of pressing issues before the state legislatures and the posi-
tion that strong special interest groups play in shaping legislation, the
expectation that these parents will be able to command the attention of
enough state legislators and elicit their assistance is unrealistic, espe-
cially in light of the expected strong response that traditional family
members may have against any changes in the custody and visitation
rights. This article next turns to this problem of seeking legislative
assistance in resolving the problems facing nonlegal parents in alterna-
tive families and establishes that, instead of abdicating their responsi-
bility, the courts must fulfill their role of applying statutory
interpretation or equitable theories to resolve these unique legal
problems.
III. THE PROBLEM OF TURNING TO STATE LEGISLATURES TO RESOLVE
PROBLEMS OF NONLEGAL PARENTS IN ALTERNATIVE FAMILIES
Nonlegal parents are unlikely to achieve legislative assistance in the
immediate future for resolving the parent-child disputes that arise dur-
ing the dissolution of their alternative families. This is true because
many of those who are most affected by the legal system's inability to
resolve this problem are members of a "discrete and insular minority"
which is politically unrepresented and, therefore, powerless to achieve
of judicial economy. Id. The petitioner in that case raised the argument that placing the
burden of proof on the petitioner to show that visitation rights would not interfere with the
custodial parent's relationship with the child was improper. Allocating the burden in this
manner would give the custodial parent(s) a virtual veto power over the matter by simply
testifying that the parties were in conflict. The court rejected this argument by finding that, if
the burden were difficult to meet, perhaps that was a proper allocation of the burden. Id.
Additionally, the court found that in similar settings, such as grandparents seeking visitation
or third parties seeking custody, the burden placed on the petitioner was similar. Id.
The court ended its discussion on this point by pointedly reminding petitioner that she
would have no rights to visitation except for the statutory grant. It notes that she has no
common law right to visitation. Id. One must wonder if the court had fully considered that
conclusion before stating it and whether it had considered any of the equitable common law
theories discussed above when making this blanket assertion.
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legislative change. 82 Even assuming that enough gay men and lesbians
could band together with unmarried heterosexuals and stepparents to
seek legislative change, they are members of groups that have been rec-
ognized as politically powerless.283
The need for the courts to use their common-law or statutory inter-
pretation powers to protect alternative families can be seen by review-
ing some of the cases that have discussed the political "powerlessness"
that gay men and lesbians have encountered in trying to obtain legisla-
tive protection. In previous cases alleging employment discrimination,
the courts have discussed whether gay men and lesbians are entitled to
quasi-suspect class status in equal protection cases.284 In order to qual-
ify for suspect or quasi-suspect status, they must establish that they (1)
have suffered a history of discrimination; (2) exhibit obvious, immuta-
ble, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete
group; and (3) show that they are a minority, politically powerless, or
that the legislative classification burdens a fundamental right.28 5  In
considering the third factor, courts are reluctant to extend heightened
protection to groups fully capable of securing their rights through the
282 See, United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938); Watkins v.
United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1348 (9th Cir. 1988) withdrawn en banc, 875 F.2d 699
(1989).
283 This assertion that gay men and lesbians, in particular, are politically underrepresented
and therefore politically powerless is not intended to discourage or dissuade activists from
continuing to proceed with our legislative agendas. Lack of success on a nation-wide, state-
wide, or local level does not mean that we should turn away from the struggle to challenge
and change the system that does not resolve problems facing alternative families. While
continuing to advocate struggles in the courts, the legislatures, and the streets, it is imperative
that we recognize our limited legislative successes and continue to force the courts to wrestle
with the issues that face us. The argument presented by this section should not be seen as an
attempt to imply that there is a lack of a significant political agenda or a lack of dedication by
gay and lesbian activists to achieve that agenda. Instead, this framework is presented simply
to establish the need for the judicial system to accept its responsibility to provide protection
when the means are available for it to do so, as is true with protecting the relationships
between nonlegal parents and the children of alternative families.
284 Recognition as a quasi-suspect class would entitle the plaintiffs to obtain strict scrutiny
review of classifications that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Strict scrutiny
review is available in equal protection challenges if (1) the classification impinges on a
fundamental right or (2) the classification impinges on a suspect or quasi-suspect class. San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). Either of these avenues is
available for strictly scrutinizing a legislative classification to determine its constitutionality.
High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir.
1990)(Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing, 895 F.2d 563 (1990)).
285 High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 (9th Cir. 1990)(citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587,
602-603 (1986)). See also, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441
(1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982); San Antonio School Indep. District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
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legislative political process.86 But, "because of the immediate and
severe opprobrium often manifested against [gay men and lesbians]
once so identified publicly, members of this group are particularly pow-
erless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena.
287
The courts that have considered the question of granting quasi-sus-
pect status to gay men and lesbians have disagreed about whether they
are "sufficiently" politically powerless to meet the criteria for quasi-sus-
pect status.2 s8  The clearest and most instructive disagreement comes
between members of the Ninth Circuit in resolving the High Tech Gays
security clearance suit.
28 9
The Ninth Circuit panel determined that gay men and lesbians are
not politically powerless because legislatures have recognized and
addressed the discrimination suffered by gay men and lesbians by pass-
ing anti-discrimination statutes on the basis of sexual orientation. Due
to this anti-discrimination legislation, the panel found that gay men and
lesbians "are not without political power; they have the ability to and
do 'attract the attention of the lawmakers,' as evidenced by such
legislation. "290
286 Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1348.
287 Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985)(Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.). See also Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 209
n.24 (N.D.Cal. 1983)("[Gay men and lesbians] attempting to form associations to represent
their political and social beliefs, free from fatal reprisals for their sexual orientation" should
be considered a discrete and insular minority.)
288 While resolving this disagreement is not necessary for the purposes of this article, it is
useful to review the debate as a means of estimating the likelihood of success in turning to the
legislative, rather than the judicial, branch of government for assistance in protecting
nonlegal parents in alternative families.
289 In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the Department of Defense's policy of subjecting
all gay men and lesbians who applied for secret and top secret clearances to expanded
investigations, mandatory adjudications, and refusals to grant security clearance to known or
suspected gay or lesbian applicants as violating the fifth amendment's due process clause and
the first amendment's guarantee of free association. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565. The 9th
Circuit reversed the District Court's conclusion that gay men and lesbians are a quasi-suspect
class entitled to heightened scrutiny and that the Department of Defense's policy violated the
constitution. Id. at 565. The 9th Circuit panel disagreed whether gay men and lesbians are
politically powerless. See Id. at 574.
290 High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574. The legislation that the panel recognized was
Wisconsin's comprehensive statute barring employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 111.31-111.395 (West 1988); the California statute prohibiting
violence against person or property based on sexual orientation, Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7 (West
1984); the Michigan statute barring denial of care in health facilities on the basis of sexual
orientation, Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 333.20201(2)(a)(West 1984); and the New York
Executive Order prohibiting discrimination in state employment and in provision of state
services on the basis of sexual orientation. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 4, § 28 (1983).
The panel also noted the numerous cities and counties that have banned discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. The panel notes ordinances in New York, Los Angeles,
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The dissent of the en banc denial of rehearing noted the paucity of
legislation that the panel used to support its position. It compared the
amount of legislation that protects racial minorities with the amount of
legislation protecting gay men and lesbians and found it incongruous
that racial minorities would be found to qualify for suspect class status
based on political powerlessness when gay men and lesbian cannot.
[The panel's] support for this proposition [of lack of political
powerlessness] ... is clearly insufficient to deprive homosexuals
of the status of a suspect classification. Compare the situation
with that of blacks, who clearly constitute a suspect category for
equal protection purposes. Blacks are protected by three federal
constitutional amendments, major federal Civil Rights Acts, ...
as well as by antidiscrimination laws in 48 of the states. By that
comparison, and by absolute standards as well, homosexuals are
politically powerless .... Certainly homosexuals as a class wield
less political power than blacks, a suspect classification, or
women, a quasi-suspect one.2
9 1
Additional support for the dissent's conclusion that gay men and les-
bians are politically powerless comes from the fact that gay and lesbian
political groups have been powerless to convince Congress to pass a
federal anti-discrimination statute. Since 1975, the Federal Gay Civil
Rights Bill has been introduced in every congressional session and has
never been passed.2 92 Although Congress passed two statutes in 1990
that do give some protection to lesbians and gay men, 93 neither of
Chicago, Washington D.C., Atlanta, Boston, Philadelphia, Seattle, and San Francisco. High
Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 (citing Developments in the Law, Sexual Orientation and the Law,
102 Harv. L. Rev 1554, 1667-1668 nn. 49-51 (1989)).
291 High Tech Gays, 909 F.2d at 377-378.
292 Sex, Lies and Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 556. The bill would add "sexual
orientation" to the protected classes listed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair
Housing Act. Id.
293 The Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990)
directs the United States Department of Justice to collect and publish statistics on crimes
showing evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. Sex,
Lies and Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 554. While this is a step in the right direction, all the
statute does is authorize the collection and publication of data. No new crimes have been
added to the federal statutes and no causes of action created to protect victims of hate crimes.
Id. More importantly, Congress was so distressed by including sexual orientation in the bill
that it felt it necessary to add disclaimers stating that it reaffirmed the value of the American
family (presumably excluding alternative families) and did not endorse homosexuality. Id.
Additionally, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 which was intended
to increase access for, and decrease discrimination against, people with disabilities in various
areas. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1990). The ADA does cover people infected
with, or perceived to be infected with, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the virus
connected with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Sex, Lies and Civil Rights,
supra note 20, at 555. Because gay men make up most of those believed to be infected with
HIV or AIDS, opponents of the bill were concerned that the statute could be used to provide
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them provided protection against discrimination and both of them were
specifically limited to prevent any belief that Congress was comfortable
passing legislation to assist gay men and lesbians.2 Additionally, only
limited success has resulted from attempts to pass comprehensive anti-
discrimination statutes, such as Wisconsin's, in other states.
[Fifteen] states295 and eighty-seven cities and counties prohibit
discrimination in public employment on the basis of sexual ori-
entation. As for more traditional civil rights statutes, covering
private employment and housing, gay and lesbian people enjoy
protection in more than forty-five cities and counties. Although
only three states, Massachusetts, Wisconsin and Hawaii,296 have
approved traditional civil rights statutes covering sexual orienta-
tion, similar legislation has been introduced in nine other state
legislatures.297 In four additional states, more limited legislation
which would protect gay and lesbian people from discrimination
in employment is pending.29
8
Additional victories in protecting gay men and lesbians have
occurred in the locales that allow same-sex couples to establish recog-
nized domestic partnerships or alternative families .2 ' But all of these
victories are limited. Not only are they confined to limited geographic
areas and provide limited protection, they are subject to voter repeal
efforts. 0 0 Significantly for this article, political powerlessness can also
be seen by the fact that none of the fifty states allow gay men or lesbians
to marry.
general civil rights for gay men and lesbians. Therefore, they included specific limitations
stating that homosexuality and bisexuality, among others, are explicitly excluded from
coverage under the statute. Id. Thus, although the ADA would protect those perceived to
have a disability, it could not be used to protect gay men or lesbians whose rights were
violated by others who perceive homosexuality to be a sickness. Id. at 555 n.37.
294 Id. at 554-556.
295 Ten states achieved this through executive order: California, Minnesota, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Colorado; three
other 'states through legislation: Maryland, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin; and two states
through civil service rule interpretation: Illinois and Michigan. Sex, Lies, and Civil Rights,
supra note 20, at 557 n.40
296 Connecticut also passed a bill prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation on April 18, 1991. 1991 Conn. Acts 91-58 (Jan. Reg. Sess.).
297 As of Feb. 1, 1991, bills were pending in the following states: Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, New York, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Pennsylvania. Sex, Lies, and
Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 557 n.43.
298 Those states are California, Maryland, NewJersey, and New York. Id. at 557 n.44. The
California legislation, which was passed by the legislature, was vetoed by Governor Wilson.
T. Wood, Gay Activists Are Surprised By Veto, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 30, 1991, at A19 col.
1.
299 Sex, Lies, and Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 557. For a list of those locales, see supra
note 5.
300 Id. at 557-558.
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Love Makes a Family
It seems apparent that gay men and lesbians are politically powerless
as a group in appealing to state legislatures to pass legislation protect-
ing them from discrimination and protecting their family arrangements.
Their attempts to achieve assistance from the legislative, judicial, and
executive branches of state and federal government have resulted in
minimal help. While some success has been enjoyed, it tends to be spe-
cific legislation that does not address across-the-board concerns of
these individuals. Given this political powerlessness, the courts must
take responsibility to use the means available to them to protect the
nonlegal parents in alternative families.
Among the solutions offered instead of case-by-case judicial resolu-
tion of these problems is for gay men and lesbians to obtain state-wide
recognition of their families through either marriage, s° ' domestic part-
302nership legislation, or other legislation that would change the defini-
tion of family."0 ' Marriage would solve some of the problems of child
custody and visitation for those gay and lesbian couples who choose to
marry, just as it solves some of these problems for those heterosexual
couples who choose to marry. Married couples receive the law's pro-
tection for a continued relationship with their children even when the
marriage dissolves. If marriage were an option, it would be easier to
accept the argument that couples who choose not to marry have made
their choice and cannot complain that the legal system will not protect
them outside of the preferred method of recognition. Additionally, if
domestic partnership legislation were passed on a state-wide basis rec-
ognizing alternative families, that option would also solve these
problems. 0 4
But marriage should not be seen as an option that will resolve all
legal problems of alternative families facing parenthood issues for
three reasons. First, marriage does not solve all these problems cur-
rently. While stepparents have received more legal recognition and
protection than other members of alternative families, that recognition
and protection has been sporadic. Stepparents are not fully recognized
as parents by the legal system and these limitations would face cur-
301 See Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 681 (1990);
Schwarzschild, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy: Moral Threat and Legal
Anomaly, 4 Berk. Women's L.J. 94 (1988-89); Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition
of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 Berk.
Women's L.J. 134 (1987-88).
302 Family Resemblance, supra note 2, at 1658-1659.
303 Colker, supra note 17, at 326. Colker does not oppose the passage of statutes opening
up marriage to gay men and lesbians but does not believe that the gay and lesbian community
should place it at the top of its political agenda.
304 Family Resemblance, supra note 2, at 1657-1659.
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rently unmarried heterosexual, gay, or lesbian couples who chose to
marry if it were an option.
Second, many heterosexual and homosexual couples do not believe
that marriage is the best option for them for their personal lifestyle or
beliefs. For example, an ongoing debate exists in the gay and lesbian
community whether the next political action should be an attempt to
attain marriage rights in the various states. Part of the debate centers
on whether broadening the individuals eligible for marriage is a polit-
ical step that should be taken.30 5
Third, gay men and lesbians are no more likely to obtain legislation
permitting them to marry than to obtain legislation recognizing their
parental bonds formed within alternative families. Currently, gay men
and lesbians do not have any option for protecting their relationships
with their children. All fifty states deny them the right to marry. 0 6 No
state has adopted a state-wide domestic partnership legislation. 30 7 No
state has explicitly granted them recognition or protection for their
relationships with the children in their alternative families that has been
afforded to biological or legal parents. They are politically powerless
to turn to the legislatures to achieve changes either in the marriage laws
305 Opponents of same-sex marriage as a high priority argue that marriage is a
sexist, patriarchal institution that lesbian and gay people should not be seeking
to enter. Entering that institution would simply contribute to our subordination
at the hands of the state. Moreover, opponents argue that there is no reason to
assume that same-sex relationships would actually gain social legitimacy by
receiving this token state sanction, Instead, lesbian and gay people would
sacrifice some of their anonymity, making them even easier targets for
discrimination. Finally, some opponents argue that if marriage is available,
lesbian and gay people would be under strong pressure to marry, because
benefits would be available only on that basis. Thus, they argue that we should
fight for recognition of a broader definition of family but not tie that recognition
to the institution of marriage.
Advocates of lesbian and gay marriage as a high priority argue that as long as
lesbian and gay people are denied this privilege, they are denied full citizenship.
While they recognize the possible problems with embracing marriage, because
of its patriarchal history, they also suggest that allowing lesbian and gay people
to enter marriage would transform the institution. Marriage could become an
institution of intimacy between equals if same-sex couples could marry. Thus,
attaining marriage for lesbian and gay people should be a priority, because that
step would make marriage-dependent benefits available to lesbian and gay
people while radicalizing the institution of marriage.
Colker, supra note 17, at 321-322 (footnotes omitted).
306 Id. at 321 n.2. Denmark does allow some of the privileges of marriage to gay men and
lesbians, although they remain forbidden from adopting children. Id.
307 Because marriage and parenthood issues are based on state law, the cities who have
provided protection to domestic partners or alternative families do not have jurisdiction to
provide them with protection or recognition of the parental bonds within their families. Id.
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or the custody and visitation statutes or to obtain state-wide domestic
partnership legislation.
As this article has shown, they have also been rejected by the courts.
Because they are outside the constitutionally protected "unitary" fam-
ily, because they are outside the statutorily protected "marital" family,
because they are outside the legal system's ability to recognize their
alternative families, nonlegal parents in alternative families have been
afforded no relief for a problem that is traumatic for both parent and
child alike. It is not good enough for the courts to throw up their hands
in anguish, note the tragic circumstances that are occurring, and claim
inability to prevent these tragedies. Polikoff, Bartlett, the Oregon legis-
lature, the Michigan courts, and numerous other courts have presented
possible solutions to the problems that face nonlegal parents in alterna-
tive families. The courts' continued refusal to remedy this problem for
alternative families evinces an abdication of their responsibility to those
turning to them for assistance.
This abdication is particularly dangerous for members of oppressed
minorities, such as gay men and lesbians.
At a time when civil rights plaintiffs are being advised, often by
sympathizers, to abandon the federal courts for other fora, it
may be important to recognize that the most dangerous subver-
sive effect of a judiciary that has abdicated its responsibility to
protect minorities from oppression would be the acceptance of
the idea that civil rights are a function of majoritarian
determination. 308
Those courts who encourage plaintiffs to seek other fora, most particu-
larly the state legislatures, to obtain protection of the relationships
between nonlegal parents and children in alternative families have
abdicated their responsibility to protect these minorities from
majoritarian oppression. Their duty, in this pluralistic community, is to
recognize the inability of the legislature to grapple with certain
problems and to provide protection to those members of politically
powerless minority groups who turn to them for assistance. When
clear remedies are available through statutory interpretation or within
currently viable equitable doctrines that can provide this protection, it
is all the more appalling that the courts are willing to turn their backs
and walk away. As many gay and lesbian activists would shout:
"Shame, shame."
308 Sex, Lies and Civil Rights, supra note 20, at 630-631.
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